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NEOLIBERALISM, COLONIALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE:
DECENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY
James Thuo Gathii*

By Brad
R. Roth. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. xxx, 439.
$95.
GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

[In the last few years, a new politics of difference is emerging whose dis
tinctive features are] to trash the monolithic and homogeneous in the
name of diversity, multiplicity and heterogeneity; to reject the abstract,
general and universal in light of the concrete, specific and particular; and
to historicize, contextualize and pluralize by highlighting the contingent,
provisional, variable, tentative, shifting and changing.1
Today, the struggle between competing universalisms (liberal democracy
v. revolutionary-democratic dictatorship) - more or less resolved, at
least for the present - seems set to be succeeded by struggle between
universalism and various particularisms (liberal democracy v. assertions
of cultural self-determination, ethnic grievance, and exceptional circum
stances). [p. 365]
INTRODUCTION

Brad R. Roth's Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law2 is
a neoconservative realist response to liberal internationalists (or uni
versalists) . As a critique, the book unsurprisingly legitimizes the sub
ject of its attack: liberal internationalism. That is so since in their op
position to each other, liberal internationalists and neoconservative
realists fall within the same discursive formation - a Euro-American

* Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University. S.J.D.
1999, LL.M. 1995, Harvard; LL.B. 1992, University of Nairobi. - Ed. I would like to thank
Celestine Nyamu, Samuel Murumba and Nathaniel Berman for their comments on an earlier
draft of this paper. I would also like to acknowledge the encouragement of Wayne Eastman,
Michael Santoro, Ed Hartman, Antony Anghie, Obiora Okafor, David Kennedy, and
Balakrishnan Rajagopal. Heidi Hanley's research assistance is appreciated.
1. Cornel West, The New Cultural Politics ofDifference, in THE IDENTITY IN QUESTION
147 (John Rajchman ed., 1995).
2. Brad Roth is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science, Wayne State
University.
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hegemony of thinking, writing, critiquing, engaging, producing, and
practicing international law.
This Review is an antihegemonic critique. It seeks to decenter this
Euro-American opposition between liberal internationalism and neo
conservative realism that has characterized the study of international
law, especially in the post-Cold War period. This Review aims to
demonstrate the limitations of the commitments of liberal internation
alism (to a universal culture of liberal democracy and free markets),
on the one hand, and of neoconservatism (to maintain the integrity of
sovereign states that have effective control of their populations by re
stricting intervention in their internal affairs), on the other hand, as
the only alternatives to understanding and producing knowledge
about legitimacy in international law.
My antihegemonic critique could very well be referred to as consti
tuting a third-world approach. Third-world because it is neither
American nor European, and because it is intended as a counterweight
to the overwhelming dominance of American and European academia
in the production of knowledge about international law. This third
world approach thus not only disrupts the hegemonic approaches to
the study of international law, but also partly embodies the political
goals of the third world, as I see them. It is thus as legal as it is political.3
This Review is inspired by scholars engaged in Third World Ap
proaches to International Law (TWAIL) who, in the last fifty or so
years, have represented a variety of shifting positions within the anti
hegemonic critique of Euro-American approaches.4 In reclaiming the
discursive energy of these engagements with international law, third
world scholarship has harnessed the critical insights from a variety of
disciplines, including postcolonialism, cultural studies, Marxism, criti·

3. It is worth noting that, in their casebook, Henkin, Pugh, and Schachter declared that
law is politics! See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
iii (3d ed., 1993) ("The years since the previous edition was published have witnessed radical
transformations in the international political system, with corresponding change . . . in inter
national law and institutions. It seems timely therefore, to make explicit the political character
and context of international law and to place it up front: Chapter One, page one.") (emphasis
added). While it is interesting that the foregoing quote implicitly acknowledges that think
ing of international law as politics was held back during the Cold War, my definition of poli
tics here is more inclusive. See infra note 5 and accompanying text
4. Some of these scholars include M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); THOMAS OLAWALE ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); S.B. Gurro, HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS FOR THE
OPPRESSED : CRITICAL EsSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS FROM
A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW PERSPECTIVE (1993); U.0. UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA (1979).
I try to articulate these positions in James Thuo Gathii, Foreword, Alternative and Criti
cal: The Contribution ofResearch and Scholarship on Developing Countries to International
Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L LJ. (forthcoming 2000); James Thuo Gathii, International
Law and Eurocentricity, EUR. J. INT'L L. 184 (1998) (book review).
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cal race theory, feminist analysis, new approaches to international law,
and critical legal theory, among others.
Elements of my antihegemonic critique of the liberal/conservative
dichotomy are linked together by two central analyses: an economic
critique and a cultural, nonmaterial critique. I do not subscribe to the
idea that cultural and nonmaterial forms of oppression underplay the
real dynamics of oppression in economic structures and relations. I do
acknowledge, however, the potential for decentering, unpacking, or
deconstructing homogeneous or universal categories of representa
tion.5
For example, legitimacy, as embodied in Governmental
Illegitimacy, occupies a Euro-American discursive framework and
excludes non-Euro-American notions of legitimacy. By unpacking
this Euro-American mode of representing legitimacy, I hope to pro
liferate the meaning of legitimacy to go beyond examining state legit
imacy into examining legitimacy in a wider context including race,
culture, class, and sex.6 My project, however, is not simply to provide
a countervailing or an authentic notion of legitimacy, but rather to
overcome the "given grounds of opposition" between liberal inter
nationalism and neoconservative realism by opening up a space to

5.

Here, I adopt Gaytri Spivak's explanation of deconstruction:

Postcoloniality - the heritage of imperialism in the rest of the globe - is a deconstructive
case. As follows: Those of us from formerly colonized countries are able to communicate
with each other and with the metropolis, to exchange and to establish sociality and transna·
tionality, because we have had access to the culture of imperialism. Shall we then assign to
that culture ...a measure of "moral luck?" I think there can be no doubt that the answer is
"no." This impossible "no" to a structure which one critiques, yet inhabits intimately, is the
deconstructive philosophical position, and the everyday here and now of "postcoloniality" is
a case of it. Further, the political claims that are most urgent in decolonized space are tacitly
recognized as coded within the legacy of imperialism: nationhood, constitutionality, citizen
ship, democracy, socialism, even culturalism. Within the historical frame of exploration,
colonization, and decolonization, what is being effectively reclaimed is a series of regulative
political concepts, the supposedly authoritative discourse narrative of whose production was
written elsewhere, in the social formations of Western Europe. They are thus being re
claimed, indeed claimed, as concept metaphors for which no historically adequate referent
may be advanced from postcolonial space.

GAYTRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, OUTSIDE IN TIIE TEACHING MACHINE 280-82 {1993) .
Anthony Appiah similarly argues that
[I]f there is a lesson in the broad shape of ...circulation of cultures, it is surely that we are
already contaminated by each other, that there is no longer a fully autochthonous eclll
African culture awaiting salv�ge by our artists (just as there is, of course, no American cul
ture without African roots).
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH,

IN MY FATIIER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN TIIE PHILOSOPHY OF

CULTURE 155 {1992).
6. As Edward Said argues with reference to orientalism:
[T]his study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western poli
tics and of the non-Western world in those politics as of the strength of Western cultural dis
course, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or "superstructural." My hope is
to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly
colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves
or upon others.
EDWARD SAID,

ORIENTALISM 25 1978.
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make possible "the construction of a political project that is new,
[and] . . . that can accept the differential
structure of the moment of intervention without rushing to produce a
unity of the social antagonism or contradiction. "7
In proliferating the meaning of legitimacy and the variety of cate
gories whose legitimacy needs interrogation, I hope to mobilize the
conceptual potential of critical analysis and theory for "change and in
novation. "8 I hope to open new arenas of inquiry that are foreclosed
within the discursive terrain of Euro-American international legal

neither one nor the other

scholarship/production. Yet, I am aware that, in seeking to transcend
the paralyzing antithesis of Euro-American international legal produc
tion, it is far too easy to foreclose systemic analysis of the foundational
themes raised by my materialist and structuralist critique of neoliberal
economics.9 I argue that the two critiques could be deployed simulta
neously. For example, neoliberal economic restructuring (or free
market reform under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions10)
relies on racial and cultural stereotyping as a central, unstated, but ap
parent, element of the otherwise neutral-sounding economic justifica-

7. HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 25 (1994). Bhabha argues such a progressive reading is
effective because it uses the subversive, messy task of camouflage and does not come like a
pure avenging angel speaking the truth of a radical historicity and pure oppositionality. If
one is aware of this heterogeneous emergence (not origin) of radical critique, then .. . the
function of theory within the political process becomes double edged. It makes us aware
that our political referents and priorities - the people, the community, class struggle, anti
racism, gender difference, the assertion of an anti-imperialist, black or third perspective are not there in some primordial, naturalist sense. Nor do they reflect a unitary or homoge
nous political object. They make sense as they come to be constructed in the discourses of
feminism or Marxism or Third Cinema or whatever, whose objects of priority - class or
sexuality or "the new ethnicity" - are always in historical and philosophical tension, or
cross-reference with other objectives.
Id. at26.
8. Id. at31.
9. Bhabha argues, however, that this is not necessarily true, since it is necessary to make
a "distinction between the institutional history of critical theory and its conceptual power
and potential for change and innovation." Id. Further, he argues that the conceptual power
of critical theory for transformation ( what he calls translation) is possible when "the tension
within critical theory between its institutional containment and its revisionary force" is ac
knowledged. Id. at32.
10. The Bretton Woods institutions are the World Bank, otherwise referred to as the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary
Fund. Both were created after the Second World War, the former to give member countries
multiyear loans for a variety of development projects, and the latter to lend to member
countries for shorter periods with a view to facilitating their currency transactions and ena
bling them to meet short-term deficits in foreign exchange. Policy-based lending, or what
has been referred to as conditionality, is an important part of the lending functions of these
institutions. These conditionalities include: national economic integration into the interna
tional economy through liberalization and deregulation; currency devaluations to spark
export-oriented growth; and a reduction of government spending, particularly to control
fiscal deficits, among other reforms. These reforms have been referred to with a variety of
labels, including the Washington Consensus and Neo-Liberalism.
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tions in favor of free markets.11 Since deconstructive critiques of uni
versal categories of representation potentially foreclose critiques of
economic relations and relations of production, the deconstructive cri
tique and the foundational critique invariably contradict each other
but also operate ambivalently throughout this Review.12
Each section of this Review focuses on a major theme(s) in
Governmental Illegitimacy. In Part I, I explain how Roth's critique of
liberal internationalism is a form of neoconservative realism, and I
outline the main themes and arguments Roth makes. Further, I argue
that Roth's neoconservative take on legitimacy as a response to liberal
internationalists reflects the extent to which debates on governmental
legitimacy in the Euro-American academia are trapped within a
Eurocentric either/or framework.
Part II argues that, notwithstanding Roth's proposal that neocon
servative realism ought to ·prevail over liberal internationalism in de
bates on legitimacy, there is a lot of common ground shared by these
liberal and conservative proposals, in terms of their implicit or explicit
endorsement of American economic hegemony internationally, and in
terms of their pretensions of universality and their commitment to a
common set of abstract legal principles.
Part III argues that Roth's analysis, in general, diminishes coloni
alism as ephemeral or exceptional, rather than as integral, continuing,
and present. In essence, the continuities and discontinuities among
colonialism, the mandate system, and the trusteeship system, as well as
the era of self-determination, are left unexamined. In Part IV, I ex
plore the consequences of Roth's maintenance of a public/private dis
tinction: that politics resides in the public arena of intervention in civil
society overseas, rather than in the private order.
Part V challenges Roth's allegiance to Euro-American conceptions
of the nonintervention norm, a norm which excludes interventions in
the economic affairs of sovereign states as a possible international le
gal violation. I also demonstrate the consequences of the Euro
American hostility to accommodating a countervailing optic that
would examine the distributional costs of the market's inability to
spread its goodies around the world efficiently, optimally, or even eq
uitably.

11. For elaboration, see James Thuo Gathii, Representations ofAfrica in Good Govern
ance Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 1998-99 THIRD
WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65.
12. Although I was born and bred in Kenya, an African country, I nevertheless ac•
knowledge that my privileged presence in the academy within the·United States has invaria
bly influenced my scholarship. It could very well be reflective of the cultural politics of the
constantly changing global economy. See generally AIAZ AHMAD, IN THEORY: CLASSES,
NATIONS, LITERATURES (1992); Aijaz Allmad, Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and the
'National Allegory', 17 Soc. TEXT3 (1987); ArifDirlik, The PostcolonialA11ra: Third World
Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 328 (1994) .
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In Part VI, I commend how Roth transcends the Liberal, linear
story that sovereignty - classically understood as a consolidated unit
that formalizes the boundary between the national and the interna
tional - is in the process of erosion and reformulation. In Part VII, I
take issue with Roth's adherence to the state as a juridical entity be
reft of its cultural, national, and ideological dimensions. I argue that,
unless the state is thought of in this larger context, it is easy to fail to
appreciate the legitimacy/illegitimacy of the postcolonial African state.
Last, in Part VIII, I examine Roth's analysis of the indeterminacy
and limitations of both liberal advocacy for participatory rights and
neoconservative advocacy for effective control as barometers of le
gitimacy. Neither of these approaches to legitimacy can be seen out
side its alliance with regressive political and economic programs. For
example, Roth celebrates Haiti as a success story of intervention be
cause it exemplifies the emerging liberal consensus that participatory
rights are a barometer of legitimacy. But the celebration of interven
tion should not obscure its costs. As a consequence of intervention,
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide abandoned a popular economic pro
gram that would have benefited the large Haitian underclass by redis
tributing the wealth held by Haiti's military-economic elite. This also
resulted in the return of poor Haitian refugees to Haiti in violation of
their rights against non-refoulement with the legal imprimatur of the
United States Supreme Court and the collaboration between the
United States and the Haitian elite in the domination and exploitation
of the Haitian underclass. The Review ends with a conclusion that
sums up the broad outlines of my argument.
I.

DEFINING ROTH'S NEOCONSERVATIVE REALIST CRITIQUE

I characterize Roth as a neoconservative realist for a variety of
reasons. First, Roth, like early American realists, is not wedded to the
idea that abstract legal concepts determine the content of subrules and
outcomes of legal controversy. Roth's analysis can, in fact, be analo
gized to American international legal thinkers of the postwar period.
These thinkers rejected positivism and began inquiring into whether
or not international law was moored in a moral foundation. These
thinkers also recognized the individual as a subject of international
law and expressed skepticism about the overdetermination of state
sovereignty.13
Although Roth's analysis is realist in that sense, it adds up to being
an overdeveloped critique of the indeterminacy of legitimacy in the
public sphere within Western society. Hence, Roth examines the
place of social reality in both liberalism and revolutionary democratic

13. For a review of this tradition, see Carl Landauer, J.L. Brierly and the Modernization
ofInternational Law, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 881, 917 {1993).
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dictatorship (as opposed to, say, their abstract principles and form),
but he pays no attention to the pretences of neutrality and therefore of
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the private international rules that
undergird market activity. This anomaly similarly characterizes public
international legal scholarship and marks where Roth departs from
American legal realism and postrealist thought.
Second, Roth is like a neoconservative since his take on legitimacy
and illegitimacy of governments is very much a critique of liberalism,
specifically liberal internationalism, for overextending itself as the
only and universal source of governmental legitimacy.14 Governmental
perhaps one of the first book-length critiques of liberal
internationalism in the area of governmental illegitimacy in interna
tional law. The neoconservative tradition is specific to the United
States and is embedded in American exports such as neoliberalism15
and democracy-promotion programs. The neoconservative tradition is
roughly a nineteenth-century laissez-faire commitment supplemented
by debates that were especially critical of the New Deal and that char
acterized social, economic, and political progress as arising automati
cally from the spread of free markets, unfettered by any public con
straints. Neoconservatism in the post-Second World War period arose
as a counterpoint to New Deal liberalism. New Deal liberalism, ac
cording to the neoconservatives, overextended itself in translating wel
fare needs into legal entitlements, thereby maintaining, by legal im
primatur, dependency upon public resources by one section of the
population without reciprocal obligations. Hence, in giving public
help to undeserving citizens, the neoconservatives argued that the wel
fare state stepped outside the bounds of classical liberalism and that it
was therefore necessary to return to the era when such legally pro
tected entitlements were shorn back. After all, the neoconservatives

Illegitimacy is

argued, welfare was neither contractually "earned," as prior contribu
tions were, nor tied to any previous effort or responsibility; it could
not be conceptualized as the fruits of a prior fixed arrangement with
the government.16

14. I am not suggesting a conspiracy between Roth and neoconservative thinkers in the
United States. In fact, my claim is not that Roth has any affiliation or relation to these neo
conservatives, but rather that the common thread that runs between Roth and other neocon
servatives is their disdain for liberalism overextending itself. In the context of American
political life, leading neoconservative thinkers include: IRVING KRISTOL, TWO CHEERS FOR
CAPITALISM (1978); THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH ( Nathan Glazer & Irving Kristo!
eds., 1976); DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976).
15. Neoconservatism is embedded in neoliberalism in that both distrust governmental
regulation of the economy and prefer free markets in the allocation of resources. For a defi
nition of neoliberalism, see supra note 10.
16. For an excellent reading of the gendered and racial underpinnings of welfare in the
United States, see Susan Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a
Keyword ofthe U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 3 09 {1994). For an overview of the controversy,
see ALAN BRINKLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998) and GARETH DAVIES,
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In analogizing Roth to neoconservatives, my point is that his book
is very much a critique of what he considers to be the over
determination of liberal internationalism as the barometer of legiti
macy of governments. In this way, he shares with neoconservatives
the urge to swing the pendulum away from the liberals towards an al
ternative view of international society - which, contrary to the liberal
faith in a laissez-faire world order bringing progress to humanity, is a
society so plural as to render illusory any such unifying source of hope
for the disparate societies in the international community. That the
pendulum shifts between these two alternative images in Western so
ciety is not surprising.17
Third, in resorting to a whole range of Anglo-American philoso
phies to justify his proposition, Roth reproduces a significant short
coming - the quest for a foundational standpoint of impartial judg
ment on procedural (the illegitimacy of states) as opposed to
substantive (e.g., equality) commitments, while simultaneously rele
gating institutional innovation and substantive concerns and their le
gitimacy or illegitimacy to a secondary, merely technical or tactical,
stage of reflection. Hence, unlike neoconservatives who turn towards
private markets and the private realm -and away from the state - as
mediating structures of social, economic, and political life Roth em
braces the state and is silent on the significance, if any, of markets or
of the private sphere in his conception of governmental (il)legitimacy.
For Roth, illegitimacy and legitimacy of governments are procedural
concerns that only implicitly involve normative choices. In fact, Roth
tries to establish a norm of governmental illegitimacy as a counter
point to the relativist, policy-based, and substantive democratic enti
tlement norm and, of course, to the revolutionary democratic dictator
ship alternative. Roth's norm of governmental illegitimacy is designed
to avoid this relativism since he postulates it as a procedural norm that
is perhaps neutral and therefore legally acceptable in a plural interna
tional society.
The silence regarding the private sphere places it and the hierar
chies inherent within it beyond scrutiny in Roth's proposal. In fact,
the paradox of Roth's position is that, although he remains committed
to popular will, his examination of only the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of state authority invariably endorses the inequalities inherent in the
private order, which overlays the authority of any government pro
viding its public imprimatur in private ordering. One could then ask,
why keep the private sphere, within which peoples' most fundamental
interests (especially in deeply unequal societies) are constituted, shut

FROM OPPORTUNITY TO ENTITLEMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION AND DECLINE OF GREAT
SOCIETY LIBERALISM {1996).
17. See, e.g., David Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 343 (1994); Landauer, supra note 13, at 908-17.
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off from the debate on illegitimacy, unless one were endorsing the pri
vate realm as an arena of individual freedom and choice rather than
an arena characterized by inequality, coercion, and unfreedom?18 I
would therefore argue that the reason why Roth remains a neoconser
vative realist rather than a neoliberal is found in his near-total neglect
of anything economic in his analysis of legitimacy and illegitimacy.19
A.

Main Themes of Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law

Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law is well-written,
well-argued, and well-researched. Its author is the recipient of the
American Society of International Law's annual certificate of merit
award for a work in a specialized area, an indication that this book de
serves more reviewers' attention than it has attracted. In view of the
importance of the themes that the book tackles and the bold insights
that Roth makes, this Review argues that, although Governmental
Illegitimacy does break new ground in post-Cold War international
legal theory on illegitimacy of governments, it remains wedded to a
Eurocentric bipolarity that is specifically American in its continuation
of a neoconservative realist20 response to liberal internationalists.21 In
18. On this point, see Christopher Pierson, Democracy, Markets and Capital: Are there
Necessary Economic Limits to Democracy?, 40 POL. STUD. 83 {1992).
19. Roth, however, briefly notes that it is possible that the revolutionary tradition of
revolutionary democratic dictatorships itself is
not so moribund as is now fashionably believed.... [T]he contemporary failure of the revo·
lutionary project in no way invalidates the insights that prompted so many to embrace it.
The deficiencies of liberal democracy not only remain, but are being exacerbated as "actu·
ally existing liberalism" retreats, in much of the world, to a harsh nineteenth-century model of
negative liberty amid social stratification and economic despair.
At the moment, the revolutionary orientation has no viable alternative economic model lo
offer. There is no reason to assume, however, that this will forever be so. Should the revolu·
tionary phoenix rise from the ashes, old questions will arise anew.
P. 120 (emphasis added).
20. Roth refers to his brand of analysis as conservative:
[I]t would be disingenuous to claim that the instant work (or any work in legal interpreta·
tion) is a neutral rendering. Wherever possible, it reads the source materials as coherent
rather than chaotic, and it presents established legal doctrines, especially those emphasizing
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, in a light that suggests that they are not, as
some have maintained, altogether lacking in moral vision. It is, in a sense, inherently a con·
servative project.
P. 34 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Hence, I have coined this term not pejoratively,
but in reference to Roth's self-described brand of analysis, and in the hope of capturing a
series of analytical commitments that characterize the book. For example, Roth is neither a
realist believer in power politics nor a moralist committed to the idea that ideals govern in
ternational affairs. Pp.4-5. Instead, Roth observes that, since it is possible to have multiple
interpretations of international legal norms that are "reasonable," the cynical perception of
these interpretations is a "problem" that "can be cured only by more rigorous examination
of international legal principles." P. 8 (emphasis added). Roth states:
There can thus be no question that recognition of governments - in this specific sense of
acknowledging their capacity to assert rights, incur obligations, and authorize acts in the
name of the state - is "eminently a question of international law". Fulfillment of the obli·
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so doing, the book excludes from its purview non-Western notions of
governmental legitimacy.22
There is perhaps no simple way to sum up the thesis of Roth's
book. But one major theme is that the increasingly popular view
among liberal scholars in international law - that citizens now have a
democratic entitlement to vote in elections and therefore to elect a
government of their choice - is a form of Western cultural and ideo
logical imperialism. To be sure, although Roth has a healthy dose of
skepticism in this version of liberal internationalism, cultural imperi
alism is not what he uses to describe his disagreement with proponents
of the new democratic entitlement norm. Rather he says that "[t]he
peace and security order embodied in the United Nations Charter" is
designed in part to enable states "to order their own affairs unmo
lested by the predatory designs and ideological or cultural impositions
of foreign powers."23 This statement embodies the essence of Roth's
gations of the international system requires according legal recognition to such authority as
legitimately represents the state to which obligations are owed, and denying legal recogni
tion to would-be usurpers. This imperative must inform any effort to elaborate the doctrinal

context within which recent recognition controversies need to be assessed.

P. 123 (emphasis added). The emphasis on legality in resolving the question of legitimacy's
exact location seems to be a critical part of Roth's analysis. Overall, Roth's project is one of
improving international legal theory on the subject of legitimacy, which he finds time and
again to be rudimentary, inadequate, inchoate, and incomplete. This type of improving or
attempting to give respectability to legal analysis has been referred to as a rationalizing legal
analysis. See ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 34 (1996).
21. My argument here is basically that Roth's analysis of legitimacy is based upon competing sources of legitimacy, all posed in polarities. Roth believes that:
[to] understand what counts for the international community as a plausible innovation of
popular will, one must be acquainted with the breadth of the range of legitimacy rationales
that have maintained a substantial following in contemporary times. To put it glibly, the in
ternational community contains liberal democrats, non-liberal democrats, liberal non

democrats, and non-liberal non-democrats, all whom profess fidelity to the abstract principle
of popular sovereignty.

Pp. 39-40 (emphasis added). Hence, Roth contrasts, for example, the liberal democratic en
titlement school with an alternative approach to the location of legitimacy - the revolution
ary democratic dictatorship. These alternatives posed by Roth are Western or Eurocentric
approaches to thinking about legitimacy and they exemplify a "pathological" feature of
Western knowledge systems - binary thinking. This arises in part from a system of knowl
edge management that is biased towards
particularly scientific management ... [and is] characterized by its insistence of logical de
duction from self evident axioms as the only basis of knowledge ... its emphasis on analysis,
its claim that knowledge must be articulate in order to ... [demonstrate] its pretence to uni
versality, its celebral nature, its orientation to theory and empirical verification of theory and
its odd mixture of egalitarianism within the knowledge community and hierarchical superi
ority versus outsiders.

FREDERIQUE MARGLIN & STEPHEN MARGLIN, DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE 204 (1990).
22. For a recent example of an effort to assert a non-Western theory of governmental
legitimacy, see Edward Kofi Quashigah, Legitimate Governance: The Pre-Colonial African
Perspective, in LEGffiMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 43 (Edward Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor eds., 1999).
23. Pp. 1-2. Roth argues, for example, that determining the "genuineness" of elections
in terms of the will of the people is "arguably, inextricable from cultural, social and ideologi-
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project. Instead of tracing the emergence of a new norm of demo
cratic entitlement through reinterpretation of the sovereignty norm,
Roth seeks to predicate the increased importance on the will of the
people or popular sovereignty on the doctrine of "legal recognition"
of governments, and not on international guarantees of participation
as liberal internationalists have done. This doctrine is closely related
to the irrebuttable presumption in international law that a government
is legitimate when it has effective control. Effective control in this
context represents the will of the underlying political community ex
cept in cases of alien, racist, or colonial regimes that are illegitimate ab

initio.24
In his own words, Roth seeks to determine:

(1) the extent to which a norm of popular sovereignty has displaced the
protections that international law has traditionally accorded de facto
authorities; (2) the extent of that norm's relationship (if any) to Iiberal
democratic principles of government; and (3) the legal implications of
this development for forcible and non-forcible multilateral interventions
in the internal affairs of states. [p. 1]
He concludes that the collective practice of states in the post-Second
World War period suggests that, in the democratic entitlement school,
there is an "increased significance of empirical manifestations of
popular will in ad hoc evaluations of governmental legitimacy, but de
nies that this development entails the emergence of a liberal
democratic 'legitimism' " (p. 4).
In my view, although the book adds an interesting spin to the le
gitimacy debate in its construction of the will of the people through
the effectiveness of a government's control, there is a way in which it
also leaves international law in the undesirable Cold War stalemate
reached between liberals and conservatives.
Governmental
Illegitimacy is a neoconservative realist take on legitimacy of govern
ments, because it criticizes the liberal internationalist location of
governmental legitimacy in the realm of international legal guarantees
of individual participation in their governments. 25 It argues in favor of
a norm of governmental illegitimacy that arises not from the idealistic

cal matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction, the result being (however
regrettably) that the regime itself is privileged to act as the authoritative interpreter of local
norms, and thus of its own international obligations." P. 164.
24. See infra Part III for a more extended discussion of Roth's views of colonial, racist,
or alien regimes.
25. Roth notes, for example, that Article 21(3) of the U.N. Charter, "[i]nterpreted
through the lens of liberal-democratic political thought . . . puts human rights on a collision
course with non-intervention norms, positing a human rights norm as the sole legitimate ba
sis of sovereignty itself." P. 164. In Roth's view, liberal democrats committed to arguing
that the will of the people is the basis of government authority understate or ignore Article 2
(7) of the U.N. Charter, which enshrines the nonintervention norm.
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premises of the International Bill of Rights,26 but from the practice or
customs of states as may, for example, be evidenced in whether they
have effective control of their territory (p. 189). In Roth's view, the
"international system regards ruling apparatuses as self-sufficient
sources of authority - or rather deems their authority to derive from
their characteristic ability to secure the acquiescence of their pop
ulaces, by whatever means" (pp. 162-63; emphasis added). The will of
the people can then be construed from whether the people's govern
ment has effective control over its territory; where the government has
effective control, the people have acquiesced to such a government as
a legitimate authority over them, except where the regime exercising
such authority is colonial, racist, or alien.27 For Roth, de facto control
is not a mechanistic description of facts on the ground, but rather re
quires a "complex" interpretive framework to reveal the underlying
moral logic of sovereign equality. De facto control and sovereign eq
uality of states are not the cold, amoral concepts that the liberals have
represented, but rather signifiers of the increased significance of pop
ular will in evaluations of governmental legitimacy.28

26. The International Bill of Rights consists of three important documents: the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at (1948);
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); the 1966 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAPR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The last two documents came into
force in 1976.
27. Roth argues that it is striking that, in drafting Article 25 of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (unlike Article 21(3) of the U.N. Charter), the draft
ers "avoided the collision with non-intervention norms by omitting any statement as to the
basis for the authority of government." P. 164. In Roth's view, therefore, "the basis of

authority may be such popular will as is expressed by habits of obedience to the regime in ef
fective control, a will that is further expressed in such elections as the effective regime sees fit to
hold." P. 164 (emphasis added). Further, in asserting the significance of a government in
actual control, Roth argues that "non-intervention rules remain at the disposal of the gov
ernment in effective control to assert in the name of the state." P. 165. He also concludes
that
non-intervention norms clearly and consciously discriminate in favor of the established gov
ernment. The same foreign military assistance that constitutes an unlawful use of force
when extended to anti-government factions is generally lawful when extended to govern
ment forces. It is even more clearly true that non-forcible foreign participation in internal
affairs, however problematic when in aid of groups seeking to undermine or overthrow the
established government, is unproblematic when in aid of the government . . ..
[I]nternational law ordinarily has recognized the apparatus in effective control to be the
government for such purposes.
P. 171 (footnote omitted).
28. Pp. 2-4. Roth later argues that:
The ordinary lack of international attention to the basis of governmental authority is fre
quently attributed to crass pragmatism rather than principle. What this attribution fails to
comprehend, however, is that applicable principles, to the extent that they embody positive
international law and not mere abstract moralizing, are, of necessity, eminently pragmatic.
Moreover, sovereign equality, the cornerstone of overlapping consensus in the international
community, is itself a morally grounded principle. The equality of political communities en
tails, in the ordinary case, accepting on equal terms such stable internal arrangements as pre-
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This indeterminacy (between international legal entitlements and
interpretations of de facto control and sovereign equality of states) of
the source of legitimacy for governments is therefore a major linchpin
upon which Roth predicates his critique of liberal internationalists.29
It is also the very reason that I argue that the book takes us back to a
stalemate already reached between conservatives and liberals during
the Cold War. A second source of frustration with the book arises in
part from the fact that this neoconservative realist position repeats the
mistake made by its subject of attack, liberal internationalism. By
predicating a norm of governmental illegitimacy on actual praxis
rather than on international legal guarantees, as the acid test for le
gitimacy in a plural international society, neoconservative realists
overlook the fact that even the determination of seemingly factual
evidence, such as whether a government has effective control over its
territory, could be as subjective and as manipulable as the determina
tion of whether an election was free and fair under the International
Bill of Rights. This problem arises in part because Roth's proposal of
de facto control as a source of legitimacy or illegitimacy of states is not
integrated throughout his analysis with his misgiving that de facto con
trol does not always square with political will, an issue he takes up
mainly in his discussion of recognition contests in Chapter Seven (pp.

2, 183, 197, 253).
Seen another way, Roth's neoconservative realism could be said to
reflect his defense of the Westphalian state system complete with its
attendant doctrines of statehood as a natural and necessary view of the
world, while the liberal internationalists hold this view in contempt for
being a defense of what they consider an old and decaying order. For
the liberal internationalist, the state system has now been superceded
by a multitude of interlocking jurisdictions, the market economy and a
variety of regional and international actors all underpinned less by
their commitment to their respective states and increasingly on a uni
versal commitment to free markets and the values of liberal democ
racy. They argue that the traditional functions of the state have been
greatly undermined as state boundaries have become more porous to
flows of capital, goods, and technology.30
sent themselves. It further quite arguably entails, as a matter of respect for persons whose
circumstances and ways of thinking are imperfectly understood by outsiders, acknowledging
at face value the decision of a people to acquiesce in those arrangements.

P.345.
29. For a discussion of this indeterminacy in the context of colonial, racist, or alien re·
gimes, see pp. 201-51.
30. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 8 7 AM. J. lNT'L L.205 {1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et
al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisci·
plinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. lNT'L L. 367 {1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law
in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal
International Relations Law Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
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For Roth, the state and its (il)legitimacy remain a central focus.
While liberal internationalists look to the International Bill of Rights,
among other sources, to justify a democratic entitlement for citizens as
the basis of state legitimacy or illegitimacy, Roth construes legitimacy
and illegitimacy from the state in the first place. In his view, legitimate
force can only be imposed by a legitimate state apparatus. In exercis
ing such legitimate force, such an apparatus must be "acting on what I
acknowledge to be their duty or license under a duly constituted sys
tem of governance to which I am concededly subject (even if I am
justly in opposition to any number of its policies)" (p. 17). The state
and its apparatus of power are for Roth the starting point in appreci
ating legitimacy and illegitimacy. From this understanding, legitimacy
can be construed as the acquiescence of citizens to a necessary institu
tion or evil in society - the state. This is not a benign idea of the
state, nor is it a benevolent one.
For example, Roth's brief discussion of usurper governments fol
lowing coups d'etat is confined to the legal significance of their acts
and "the obligations of citizens with respect to those acts as might be
seen retroactively following the restoration of the legitimate govern
ment" (p. 156). This discussion telescopes complex and elaborate
questions surrounding the legitimacy of regimes that result from suc
cessful coups and revolutions both in the international and domestic
constitutional and legal contexts.31 Telescoping the significant moral
and political issues raised by such "revolutionary" circumstances into
legal questions (contained in doctrines such as state necessity and im
plied mandate) is only one example of the manner in which the ambi
tion of the subject matter of the book and its reach stand at a disjunc
ture. Moral and political controversy are so central to discussions on
legitimacy that they cannot be ignored even by international lawyers.32
It is interesting that Roth does not discuss the public policy alternative
to state necessity and implied mandate as one of the innovations
crafted by courts in responding to a constitutional crisis such as a coup
d'etat.33 Does the exclusion of this strategy of responding to constitu& POL'Y 717 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183; Anne-Marie Burley, Toward An Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 393 (1992). For a critique of Slaughter's liberal international law, see, for exam
ple, Outi Korhonen, Liberalism and International Law: A Centre Projecting a Periphery, 65
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 481 (1996). For other critiques of liberal renewal narratives, see gener
ally Martii Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455
(1966); Susan Marks, The End of History?: Reflections on Some International Legal Thesis,
18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 449, 467-75 (1997).
31. There is perhaps no better comprehensive and authoritative assessment of these is
sues than Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coups d'Etat and Com
mon Law, 27 CORNELLINT'LLJ. 49 (1994).
32 See, for example, id. at 53-58 for a poignant discussion on this point.
33. For a discussion of the public policy alternative to state necessity and implied man
date, see id. at 53, 62.
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tional crisis disclose a bias in favor of innovations that are legalistic
rather than open-ended policy considerations of controversial moral
and political issues?
Roth's analysis in Governmental Illegitimacy therefore reveals a
strong neoconservative realism which, by combining philosophical,
doctrinal, and policy analysis, asserts the importance of state power
over other political and moral commitments in his conception of le
gitimacy and illegitimacy of states. Indeed, Roth focuses on the state
"in the sense of the apparatus that rules in the name of a given politi
cal community, otherwise known as a 'government' " (p. 22). Roth's
focus on when political authority is legitimate tells where his analysis
of legitimacy begins - with the governmental power rather than with
individual freedom as in the case of liberal internationalists.
This Review also attempts to move beyond the neoconservative
realist response to liberal internationalism in at least two major ways:
first, by demonstrating how the history of colonialism in international
law has been central in constructing regimes of governmental illegiti
macy and legitimacy in ways ignored in the Western lib
eral/conservative realist debates; and second, by demonstrating how
the post-Cold War debate on the legitimacy of governments is closely
related to neoliberal economic restructuring, an alliance (between the
politics and economics of Western domination of developing coun
tries) also ignored in the debate between the Western liberals and
conservative realists writing on international law. I interpret the ab
sence of engagement with the history of colonialism and neoliberalism
in debates on governmental legitimacy and illegitimacy as a reflection
of an ideological predilection for the rich industrial democracies across
the Atlantic.
In reviewing the book, I therefore examine the understatement of
several themes that touch on illegitimacy of governments in interna
tional law in contesting the privileging of Roth's preoccupation with
determining the legal content of his proposed norm. I challenge
Roth's commitment to norm creation, suggesting it is oblivious to its
alliance with a very undemocratic program of global economic gov
ernance - neoliberalism and a history of colonialism. Undoubtedly,
however, my reading of Roth is not any less circumstantial and contin
gent than his reading of international law.

B. Eurocentric Moorings: Taking Legitimacy Beyond Liberalism
and Conservatism
Since the end of the Cold War, an industry in international legal
circles has developed around justifying more interventionism in inter
national affairs to protect human rights, avert or attend to interna
tional humanitarian emergencies, install democracies, monitor elec
tions, and oversee transitions from authoritarian one-party states and
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military regimes, among a variety of similar do-gooder programs and
projects. Governmental Illegitimacy is one of the first scathing book
length critiques of this liberal enterprise. I am not sure whether the
publication of the book will spur another flourishing industry in inter
national legal academia, signaling the demise of the liberal triumpha
lism of the post-Cold War period. It is too early to tell. Yet, the point
must be made that the book has come much too long after the ascen
dancy of liberal triumphalism34 - an indication that a competing in
dustry providing devastating critiques is yet to emerge. However, with
the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,35 the qualified ac
cession of the International Criminal Court36 and the circus surround
ing congressional delay and reluctance to pay U.N. dues,37 we may be
seeing a coalescence of neoconservatism that will flow into interna
tional legal academia in the United States. This possibility is not with
out merit. After all, my argument is that liberals and conservatives
have had alternating periods of activist and passivist internationalist
projects and goals. Governmental Illegitimacy represents an attempt
to tilt the balance in favor of a neoconservative tradition and away
from the liberals who have been on the ascendant since the end of the
Cold War.
34. Liberal triumphalism is associated with the claim that, after the end of the Cold War,
liberal democracy prevailed as the final form of human government, just as free markets
have become ascendant as the most effective mechanism of achieving human progress. See,
e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, "A Reply to My Critics," (1989/1990) THE NATIONAL INTEREST at 25.
35. General Assembly Resolution 50/245 of September 10, 1996. The Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. Drafted at the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva, the Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly on September 10, 1996. It was
opened for signature on September 24, 1996 at United Nations Headquarters. As of March
8, 2000, 155 States had signed the CTBT, and instruments of ratification had been deposited
by 54 States.
36. The purpose of the Court will be to serve as a permanent international criminal
court to try persons charged with genocide or other crimes of similar gravity. The Court's
constitutive document is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9*) [as corrected by the proces-verbaux of 10 November 1998 and 12 July
1999]. For a discussion of the history of the establishment of the Court and the nature of
U.S. Objections, see the collection of articles on Developments in International Criminal
Law in 93 AM. J. INT'L L., 1-123 (1999).
37. Until quite late into 1999, the United States withheld its dues to the United Nations
primarily because Congress insisted that reform within one section of the U.N. was an im
portant prerequisite for these dues to be released. On January 20, 2000, the Chairman of the
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations addressed the United Nations Security Coun
cil and outlined the nature of his objections to releasing U.S. dues to the U.N., including re
sentment of the U.S. within the U.N., the excessive contributions of the U.S. to the U.N.
relative to other members, and Jack of reform within the U.N. In fact, Senator Jesse Helms
indicated that further releases of these outstanding amounts would only be made subject to
the U.N.'s undertaking reforms that it had committed itself to in an agreement with the U.S.
See Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Address
Before the United Nations Security Council (Jan. 20, 2000), available at: <http://www.
senate.gov/-helms/FedGov/UNSpeech/unspeech.html>.
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The alternating liberal and neoconservative moments of American
foreign policy are reflected within theoretical and methodological
preferences in the traditions of American legal realism, critical legal
studies, and, of course, poststructuralism, among others.38 Simply
stated, the liberals are cast as naive believers in the potential efficacy
that law has for completing the promises of modernity in international
law: peace, development, and respect for human rights. By contrast,
the neoconservatives argue that the hopes of modernity will be com
promised by the power politics and interests of states around the
world.
Here I argue that debates on governmental illegitimacy are there
fore trapped within this either/or framework - for example, that le
gitimacy can only be sourced in either a liberal or conservative tradi
tion. This dichotomization is based on a Eurocentric genealogy: the
opposition between individualism and community; fact and value; rea
son and desire; form and substance.39 Eurocentric genealogies in in38. For an attempt to canonize various approaches to the study of international law in
the United States, see Steven S. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Symposium on Method In
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (1999).
39. According to Roberto Unger:
Wherever liberal psychology prevails, the distinction between describing things in the world
and evaluating them will be accepted as the premise of all clear thought. Because classical
metaphysics disregards that distinction, we can no longer speak its language. Yet, there is at
least one familiar way of thinking to which the distinction cannot be applied, the beliefs of
religion. Indeed, the view that the understanding of what we ought to is part of a compre
hension of what the world is really like is a well-recognized characteristic of religious ideas.
Between liberal psychology and religion, there can be no lasting peace, but at most an illu
sion of mutual tolerance. From the standpoint of the liberal psychologist, religion must be
treated as a creature of desire,just as magic can be described as a forerunner of reason.
ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLmCS 41 (1976) (citation omitted). This telling
distinction between modernity and premodernity, with reason as a baseline, is a well-known
lineage of Western thought that has also been traced within international law. See David
Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, in THE INFLUENCE OF RE
LIGION ON TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mark Janis ed., 1991); David
Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1986). This tradition of
Western thought, however, claimed superiority over non-Western forms of knowledge as a
source of knowledge. Western forms of knowledge, especially at the height of reason during
the Enlightenment, discredited non-Western knowledge, culture, and way of life as inferior
and claimed universality to Western forms of knowledge. Not infrequently, notions of racial,
religious, political, and economic difference were mobilized to give credence to colonial
subjugation of non-Western peoples. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries:
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3
(1999) [hereinafter Anghie, Finding the Peripheries); Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria
and the Colonial Origins ofInternational Law, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996); Antony
Anghie, "The Heart of My Home": Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru
Case, 34 HARV. INT'L LJ. 445 (1993); Antony Anghie, Universality and the Concept of Gov
ernance, in LEGmMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 22, at 21; Antony Anghie, Creating the Nation State: Co
lonialism and Making of International Law (1995) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard
University) (on file with the Harvard University Library) [hereinafter Anghie, Creating the
Nation-StateJ.

For another fascinating legal account of such claims to dominance of Western forms of
knowledge, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
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ternational law juxtapose notions of individualism in liberalism with
notions of communitarianism in Rousseauian or Marxian terms. Un
surprisingly, Roth unearths genealogies of Rousseau and Marx in
European discourses of legitimacy to upend what he considers to be
the overdetermined location of legitimacy within liberalism, especially
in the post-Cold War period.
My complaint with this basic project is that it provides only two
possible and polar alternatives to governmental legitimacy: liberalism
and conservatism. This limited range of options excludes non
Western conceptions of legitimacy. Its effect, therefore, is to deny dif
ference or multiple and heterogeneous possibilities of the meaning
and scope of legitimacy since it only presents alternatives that are
diametrically opposed to each other and that are all trapped within
liberal psychology. For example, "[l]iberal individualism denies dif
ference by positing the self as a solid, self sufficient unity, not defined
by or in need of anything or anyone other than itself. . . . Community,
on the other hand, denies difference by positing fusion rather than
separation as the social ideal."40
Consequently, the debate of legitimacy in international law has
been about states rather than nongovernmental entities or even inter
national institutions such as the United Nations or the Bretton Woods
institutions. Notwithstanding their hegemonic presence in determin
ing what constitutes development across the third world, the legiti
macy of the Bretton Woods institutions remains outside the purview
of the legitimacy debate in international law. I argue that a different
epistemological point of knowing than that presented by the impasse
between liberalism and conservatism in Eurocentric thought, from
which alternative conceptions of legitimacy may be imagined, is neces
sary to interrogate the legitimacy of international legal processes and
institutions, as well as to give voice to different and non-European
voices and conceptions of legitimacy, democracy, and empowerment.
That would also decenter the current Eurocentric conception of le
gitimacy.41

(1990). In a sequel, Robert Williams gives an account of the legal conceptions
that American Indians utilized in their relations with the West, rather than the legal ideas
that the West used in justifying their colonial subjugation of American Indian people. See
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997).

THOUGHT

40. Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in
FEMINISMIPOSTMODERNISM 300, 307 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).

41. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global
Community and the Incommensurability ofDifference, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996).
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CONTINUITY NOT DISCONTINUITY B ETWEEN LIBERAL AND
CONSERVATIVE 0SCILLATIONISM

In the United States, various orientations of conservative thought
have from time to time justified: nonrecognition of international trea
ties by the United States; the dominant place of American strategic
and economic interests as superceding any others in international af
fairs; and the secondary place of morality in international politics. It
does seem in a rough fashion that, during democratic administrations,
the liberals are on the ascendancy while, during republican administra
tions, conservativism or Kissingerian realism kicks in.42
For example, Woodrow Wilson, the famed icon of American in
ternationalism, died frustrated in the face of a rising tide of nativism
and isolationism in a United States unconvinced it needed to play an
actiye part in international affairs.43 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act44 of
1930 was perhaps a high point of American isolationism in interna
tional affairs, as was the period of American self-doubt after the
Vietnam War debacle.45 It was not until President Ronald Reagan,
when the United States reinstated what he called the struggle against
the "evil empire," that American isolationism was interrupted.
This oscillation between liberalism and conservatism has its own
problems. First, there is a continuity rather than a discontinuity in
American economic hegemony worldwide, especially since the 1940s,
so that, even in periods of isolationism, the economic goals of the
United States remained at the forefront of American foreign policy.
One then sees a continuity between liberal and conservative periods of
international politics insofar as economic and strategic goals continue
to predominate in both periods. Hence, international legal scholars in
the U.S. supported Cold War goals of nuclear testing, armed interven
tion in the name of democracy (even where it contravened United
Nations commitments against defenseless republics), loss of human
life in the defense of U.S. strategic interests abroad, and proliferation
of free markets notwithstanding their distributional impacts across the

42 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12
LEIDEN J. lNT'LL. 9, 17-29 (1999).
43. See RUHL J. BARTLEIT, THE RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 454-57 (4th ed.
1964); DAVID STEIGERWALD, WILSONIAN IDEALISM IN AMERICA (1994).
44. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill of 1930 provoked the United States' major trading
partners into imposing retaliatory tariffs. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).

45. For example, the Congress elected in 1974 denied South Vietnam the assistance it
needed to ward off the co=unist invasion from North Vietnam. Once the United States
pulled out of Vietnam, it was unwilling to plunge itself back into the conflict and reopen the
bitter divisions that foreign involvement had wrought within the United States.
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world.46 Yet, notwithstanding this overwhelmingly conservative creed,
there has remained a faithful liberal following, such as the World
Order Model Project,47 committed to the goals of the United Nations.
There have also been the activist groups and personalities that have
thought that implementing the promises of the International Bill of
Rights is long overdue. And then there are the critical legal scholars
and the postmodernists who have remained skeptical of the ability of
international law to fulfill its liberal commitments.48
Second, continuity presents itself in the legitimacy debate through
its universalist pretensions. During the Cold War, the ideological
choices between liberalism and communism were pursued as West
East alternatives for achieving global dominance and hegemony. Lib
eralism espouses the individualism that goes with capitalism, while the
Eastern Bloc, led by the former Soviet Union, preached communism
and the communitarianism of Rousseau and Marx. For non-Western
societies, this presents a false choice - an antithesis so fundamentally
Western in its teleology and so apparent during the Cold War. Roth
argues that the ascendancy of liberalism does not rule out the reemer
gence of past revolutionary democratic orders (p. 119), perhaps illus
trating that he remains embedded within this Eurocentric framework
that conceives of liberalism and revolutionary democratic dictatorship
as the only alternatives. My point here is that, notwithstanding their

46. See generally RICHARD J. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE
UNITED STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1968); NOAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD S. HERMAN,
THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM (1979); 3 AKIRA IRIYE, The
Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS 35 (1993); WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED
STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2d ed. 1993); GADDIS SMITH, THE LAST YEARS OF THE
MONROE DOCTRINE, 1945-1993 (1994).
47. The World Order Models Project, WOMP, is a nonprofit research organization.
One of its latest reports from a multiyear project called the Global Civilization Initiative re
sulted in a book by Richard Falk. See RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE:
TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL POLmCS (1995).
48. According to David Kennedy, international legal doctrine is indeterminate because
of its circular reasoning and vagueness. In fact, Kennedy has equated mainstream ap
proaches to law with both critical legal studies and postmodernism. According to Kennedy:
If we read post-modem legal scholarship as a rotation within the legal academy - as a de
parture, but also as a continuation of the problematic of contemporary legal scholarship, we
might give the post-modem credit for a certain irony about its neo-classical imitation - to
be mocking the impossibility of both the analysis and the political invocation which it asserts.
After all, calling for "face to face politics" or for liberation of th€l "voice of women" in the
full-dress regalia of a law review article, festooned with citations and the tone of edited clar
ity, has got to suggest its own impossibility.

David Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, in CRITICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN GERMAN DEBATE 353, 395 (Christian Joerges & David M.
Trubek eds., 1989). Martti Koskenniemi argues that "deconstruction" "is only a cultural or
historical convention, a style with an emancipatory potential but which - just like Kantian
universalism - is always in danger of being transformed into a means of status quo legitima
tion." Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 351,

360 (1999).
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critique of liberalism, revolutionary democratic dictatorships of the
East were, like liberalism, also predicated upon a universalizing
model. This is because, within revolutionary democratic dictatorships,
the proletariat of the Soviet Union and the West would liberate those
of the rest of the world.49 This savior attitude towards the non-West is
evident in a variety of Western discourses on the non-West.50
Third, there is no fundamental difference between liberalism and
the conservatism within which I locate Roth. They share so much in
terms of the abstract principles between them - "rights, majority rule,
the rule of law, Judea-Christian morality" - that distinguishing one
from the other becomes difficult.51 Yet, it is not uncharacteristic for
"legal arguments . . . [to] directly or analogically translate general po
litical into legal discourse. The rhetoric of self-reliance is conserva
tive; that of sharing, liberal. The rhetoric of self-realization is liberal;
that of communal authority, conservative."52 However, it is not so
much the porous nature of these alternative ideological and discursive
frames that this Review finds compelling, but rather the broad institu
tional, social-structural, and historical context within which shifts be
tween them occur. In other words, I am as concerned with context
and history as I am with the normative reflection that is so welcome in
Roth's analysis.
Ill. INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLONIALISM, AND LEGITIMACY

In seeking to establish a legal norm of governmental illegitimacy,
there is a sense in which Roth can be regarded as overstating interna
tional law as a "set of rules with origins and applications," and under
stating it as a "history of a people with institutional, polemic and po
litical projects."53 It is perhaps this statement of international law
more as rules and less as a living project that leads Roth to understate
the susceptibility of international law's deployment in contexts such as
colonialism and economic restructuring.
49. P. 102. Roth quotes Marx and Engels at length here:
The communists
are on the one had, practically, the most advanced and resolute section
of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others;
on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advan
tage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general re
sults of the proletarian movement.
P. 102 (quoting Karl Marz & Freidrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, in
THE MARx-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978)).
50. Makau Wa Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: the Metaphor ofHuman Rights,
Paper presented at the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop Series (Mar. 19, 1999).
• . .

51. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 51 (1997).
52 Id. at 54.
53. David Kennedy, 91 AM. J. lNT'L L. 748 (1997) (reviewing SHARON KORMAN, THE
OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISmON OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE (1996)).
RIGHT
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In addition to thinking of international law as law, it could also be
seen as the site for the deployment of institutional, polemic, and po
litical projects, whether realist, moral, or otherwise. Perhaps nowhere
is Roth's commitment to the idea of international law as a set of legal
rules or principles more evident than in his proposal that the "radically
different interpretations in different parts of the world" of interna
tionally accepted norms, principles, or rules is a problem that "can be
cured only by a more rigorous examination of international legal prin
ciples" (p. 8; emphasis added). This commitment to legality to resolve
differing interpretations of the law is a form of legal totalitarianism.
One way of articulating my problem with this commitment to legal
principles to resolve different interpretations is as follows: advocating
a theory or norm of governmental illegitimacy or of democratic enti
tlement may turn out to be more important to how that theory or
norm turns out than any hard and fast notion of such a theory or
norm.
For example, in addition to examining sources of governmental le
gitimacy other than those claimed by liberals, as Roth brilliantly does,
a plausible argument may also be made that the liberal triumphalism
that has characterized American foreign policy in the post-Cold War
period marks a shift from coercive to consensual American global
domination. This new era of consensual American domination
through liberal democracy, exported through democracy-promotion
programs, may be interpreted as a new stage in American global
domination.s4 During the Cold War, the United States retained its
dominance internationally through a coercive foreign policy that en
dorsed militaristic and discreet interventionism. In the post-Cold War
period, democracy promotion, however, represents the continuity of
the maintenance of United States dominance through consensual
mechanisms that involve an alliance with third-world elites who gain
legitimacy by having to go through the hoops of competitive elections
with widespread citizen participation.ss This new model of democracy
promotion also represents the ideological victory of free-market capi
talism as a replacement for alternative visions of social and political
life, such as socialism.
In my view, colonialism, like liberal democracy and free markets, is
in one way or another embodied in the institutional, polemic, and po
litical projects of which the various rules of international law are part.
Here, I differ from Roth, who sees colonialism as an exceptional case
of illegitimacy. Instead of understanding colonialism as extinct or
even exceptional, I argue that debates on legitimacy cannot be seen
·

54. See John-Jean Barya, The New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent
View From Africa, 24 INST. DEV. STUD. 16 (1993).
55. See WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY:
INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY (1996).
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outside the dynamics of identity, power, wealth, and inequality at the
international level. Colonialism has signified and continues to signify
the manner in which ideologies based on racial and cultural differ
ences legitimated expropriation, conquest, conversion, and outcomes
such as slavery.
Governmental Illegitimacy does not fall into nineteenth-century ra
cism and in fact criticizes liberal internationalists for embracing a view
of democracy that is liberal and Western in its outlook in a pluralistic
society of nations. Yet, this celebration of pluralism could be broader.
First, it could be mobilized to delegitimize the uncritical liberal ambi
tion that is shared even in non-Western societies, to the effect of es
tablishing that people are necessarily the repositories of governmental
power without a concurrent examination of the quality of governance.
Second, and more importantly for this part of the Review, Roth's
analysis could have argued that pretensions of universality in the
norms of international law have historically been promoted by colo
nizing and dominant countries. This universalism presupposes that
there are primitive societies that fall below the so-called great civiliza
tions of the West. International law has deployed cultural and racial
stereotypes in delegitimating societies outside the West because they
fell below conceptions of the state whose standards are naturally and
necessarily assumed to be those of the so-called great Western civiliza
tions. In other words, Roth's acknowledgement of pluralism in inter
national society does not extend to acknowledging that non-Western
societies can legitimately organize their own societies on the basis of
their own civic and political virtue - without any interpretation of
their legitimacy by outsiders. Roth acknowledges cultural pluralism,
but this cannot be equated with the ethical pluralism that flows from
the various cultures of the world. While these cultures are not self
contained, Roth simply wants to predicate legitimacy of governments
on a Western state denominator - effective control of the popula
tion.56
Roth's only extended discussion of colonialism is contained in
Chapter Six. This chapter is devoted to demonstrating that colonial,
alien, and racist regimes pose a fundamental problem for his theory that popular will can be ascertained or construed through the media
tion of an effective ruling apparatus or a government with de facto
control. In his view, because of the fundamental illegitimacy of colo
nial, racist, or alien regimes, the question of the "will of 'peoples' is al
together removed from the question of effective control" (p. 199).
Therefore, Roth's discussion of self-determination is an exception to
his general thesis that, where a government has effective control over
its population, there is a presumption of legitimacy in its favor. Ac-

56. I return to this point infra Part VI. For a review essay of Eurocentricity in interna
tional law, see Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, supra note 4, at 184-211.
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cording to Roth, "[w]here 'peoples' are fighting against colonial domi
nation and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self determination,' effective control carries with it no
presumption of legitimacy, and the popular will must be ascertained
by other criteria" (p. 199; footnote omitted).
This is an important point. Yet, I quibble with it to the extent that
it diminishes colonialism as ephemeral and exceptional to interna
tional law rather than as integral, continuing, and present.57 Roth has
a brief history of conquest to self determination - told with the aim of
illustrating his understanding of self-determination rather than ex
ploring the continuities between conquest, mandates, trusteeship, and
self-determination. For example, this cursory reading is biased to the
extent to which, in summarizing a long and complex history, it pres
ents Woodrow Wilson's demands for self-determination to the Allied
Powers as if self-determination was to be applied to all colonies and
conquered territories equally. Roth presumes that Wilson's exhorta
tion was viewed by the Central Powers as representing a "universal in
terest" (p. 205). This could not be further from the truth. Wilson and
General Smuts supported the exclusion of southwest Africa from the
international supervisory mechanism (the mandate system) set up af
ter the First World War to prepare predominantly European colonies
for independence. African mandates such as southwest Africa were
ranked C, the lowest in the hierarchy.58 Smuts, whose views Wilson
shared with respect to southwest Africa and the Pacific, argued that
these German territories were "inhabited by barbarians, who not only
cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracti
cal to apply any idea of political self determination in the European

57. Roth's idea of colonialism is actual physical occupation. Hence he argues that "the
concept of self determination has necessarily played a pivotal role in twentieth-century ef
forts to erect a peace and security scheme that effectively outlaws conquest. Although past
conquests underlie almost all territorial sovereignty, these efforts established the inadmissi
bility offuture conquest." P. 203 (emphasis added).
58. According to Anghie:
The mandate system . . . proposed . . . that sovereignty was hierarchical, that it could be
graded and allocated in varying amounts to different territories depending on an assessment
as to amounts to different territories depending on an assessment as to their state of political
and economic advancement. All this was implied by the classification of mandates into 'A',
'B' and 'C' regimes . . . . The superior sovereign status enjoyed by more advanced territories,
the 'A' mandates, was manifested in the form of greater autonomy given to these mandates."
Hence 'A' mandates such as Palestine were regarded as possessing relatively sophisticated
indigenous political traditions and hence were more amenable to be transformed from this
cultural status into civilization. By contrast, the 'C' mandates like South West Africa had lit
tle or no indigenous political sophistication and needed more guidance and control to tame
their primordial ways. Unlike the 'A' mandates, the 'C' mandates were therefore less pre
pared to have sovereignty over their own affairs.

Anghie, Creating the Nation-State, supra note 39, at 238, 256, 215-87.
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sense."59 This was essentially the same logic that was used to justify
colonial conquest in the first place.
Roth's brand of analysis is characterized by the idea that colonial
ism was a rare and aberrational feature of international law. He does
not see it as continuing, systematic, and ingrained in international law
as we know it today. If we restrict colonialism to white political rule
over nonwhites, as Roth does, then it is possible to understand coloni
alism as rare and aberrational rather than contemporary and integral
to international law. But economic disempowerment and cultural im
perialism are only two examples of contemporary colonialism. In his
last English-language book, Kenyan-born Ngugi Wa Thiong'o re
minded us that the English language in former British colonies in
Africa is a "cultural time bomb" that continues a process of erasing
memories of precolonial cultures and history as a way of installing the
dominance of new, more insidious forms of colonialism.60
While today the forms colonialism takes may be hidden, interna
tional lawyers of the nineteenth century were far from subtle. For ex
ample, they argued that, being different from Judeo-Christian Europe,
Africa was culturally inferior and politically disorganized.61 This in
turn barred Africa from membership in the family of nations and the
benefits of protection under international law.62 Consequently, one of
the most important ways in which international law delegitimated non
Western societies was through racial and cultural differentiation.
Edward Said, in another context, has called this "orientalism": a
manner of regularized (or orientalized) writing, vision, and study,
dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases osten
sibly suited to the Orient, but actually tilted in favor of the Occident.63

59. SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI-SOVEREIGNS AND AFRICANS
130-31 (1996) (quoting JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS, JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS 199 (1952)).
60. See NGUGI WA THIONG'O, DECOLONIZING THE MIND 15-16 (1986). According to
Thiong'o, a
specific culture is not transmitted through language in its universality but in its particularity
as the language of a specific community with a specific history. Written literature and ora
ture are the main means by which a particular language transmits the images of the world
contained in the culture it carries.
Language as communication and as culture are then products of each other. . . . Lan
guage carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the en
tire body of values by which we perceive ourselves and our place in the world
Language
is thus inseparable from ourselves as a community of human beings with a specific form and
character, a specific history, a specific relationship to the world.
. • . .

Id. For an analysis of his earlier writings, see Josef Gugler, How Ng11gi Wa Thiong'o Shifted
From Class Analysis to a Neo-Colonialist Perspective, 32 J . Moo. AFR. STUD. 329 (1994).
For an essay that influenced the title of this Review, see NGUGI WA THIONG'O, MOVING
THE CENTER: THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM (1993).
61. See M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISmON AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD
TERRITORIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-23 (1926).
62 See id.
63. See SAID, supra note 6, at 41-49.
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There is perhaps no better study of the orientalization of interna
tional law than Antony Anghie's work. Anghie argues that colonial
ism is central to international law particularly because its doctrines
were constructed around a series of contrasting national identities,
races, and languages with European ones at the apex.64 Hence, inter
national law was less about how order was created among sovereign
states than how it managed order among entities of completely differ
ent cultural systems.65
Consequently, cultural difference was a major consideration in
whether or not an entity was considered sovereign under international
law. Those that did not match the cultural configuration that guaran
teed sovereignty could not possess it; they were illegitimate. Anghie
traces how the early writings of Francisco de Vitoria, a natural-law
theorist, and John Westlake, a positivist, justified colonial conquest
over Africa and India.66 Their rationale was simple: these non
Western societies did not possess the traits of statehood necessary to
justify their enjoyment of sovereignty. This, in turn, gave legitimacy to
colonial conquest over peoples who did not possess what was consid
ered a necessary condition for their exercise of sovereignty. Even the
mandate system was based on a parallel idea - that non-European
peoples needed to be governed by outsiders since they could not gov
ern themselves.67 Today, the idea of failed and collapsed states that
need Western tutelage bears a striking resemblance to the denial of
sovereignty for non-European societies under colonial rule and the
Wilson-Smuts logic on the mandate system. Needless to say, there are
already proposals for recolonization of failed and collapsed states.68
Consider this genealogy: in the seventeenth century, writers
opined that "savages" had sovereignty over the lands that they occu
pied, no matter how much they fell outside what was considered as
constituting civilization. These writers opined, however, that these
savages had title only to those lands they actually occupied. Vacant
land was legally terra nullius, open to seizure by any organized state
64. See Anghie, Finding the Peripheries, supra note 39.
65. See id. For a listing of many of Anghie's works, see supra note 39.
66. Examples of their writings are FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE lNDIS ET DE lVRE
BELLI REFLECTIONES [On the Indians Lately Discovered] (Ernest Nys & J.P. Bate trans.,
1917) (1696); JOIIN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1894).
67. See Anghie, Creating the Nation-State, supra note 39, at 215-87.
68. See, e.g., Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Collapsing Into Anarchy: Saving
Failed States, 353 CURRENT 33 (1993) (arguing that U.N. policies toward collapsed states
should be geared towards the concept of conservatorship, an effort designed to save nations
at risk of collapsing); Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89
FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 20 (1992) (arguing that the U.N. should help failed states, possibly
through a type of conservatorship, including the use of governance aid, U.N. trusteeship, or
the delegation of governmental authority).
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that discovered and occupied it.69 Hence the doctrine of discovery was
invented to justify conquest of non-European lands. Erner de Vattel,
writing in Switzerland in the 1750s on the basis of very scanty traveler
accounts, conditioned sovereignty on the performance of agricultural
work. Nomads, hunters, and gatherers held no such right.70 This doc
trine was later used to justify expropriation of Indian land in the pres
ent United States.71
In the nineteenth century, a stricter definition of which societies
constituted states was adopted in international legal thinking. Interna
tional lawyers in the 1890s held that general cultural inferiority and
political disorganization barred certain states (like those in tropical
Africa) from membership in the family of nations. Westlake, for ex
ample, wrote that they even lacked the power to sign legal treaties
transferring their sovereignty to a European power.72 But such dis
crimination in international law was always explicitly based on culture,
not only or necessarily on race.73 There was also the theory that
"lower races" deserved special or different treatment from the organ
ized community of nations.74 Although according to this theory they
had certain disabilities, they also had certain rights, and these were of
ten equated with those of minors in law. The Western countries, pre
sumed to be more developed images of what non-Western societies
would look like in future, were seen in the role of benevolent fiduci
aries, trustees, or guardians of non-Western societies that were pre
sumed to be less developed.75 One outcome of this line of thought was
the mandate system under the League of Nations between the two
world wars, or the trusteeship council under the United Nations Char
ter.76
69. See SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: ACQUJSITION OF TERRITORY
BY FORCE JN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1996).
70. See Erner de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou, Principles de la loi naturelle, appliques a
la conduite & aux affaires des nations & des souverains [THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR
PRJNCJPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLJED TO THE CONDUCT & AFFAJRS OF NATIONS
AND SOVEREJGNS] bk. I, ch. xviii (1758).
71. See Johnson
wrote:

v.

M'lntosh, 21 U.S (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Chief Justice Marshall

We will not enter into the cor>troversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and manufactur
ers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to
contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny,
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original
justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.

Id. at 588.

72. See WESTLAKE, supra note 66, at 137.
73. See, e.g., LJNDLEY, supra note 61, at 10-23.
74. See J.A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1902).
75. See Anghie, Universality and the Concept of Governance, supra note 39, at 22-34.
76. See Anghie, Creating the Nation-State, supra note 39.
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The roots of the post-Second World War idea of trusteeship lies
farther back in the history of European thought. The most obvious is
the chivalric ideal of the middle ages, when the knight incurred obliga
tions to help the weak along with his military status.77 More important
still was the Christian tradition, which laid a great stress on prosely
tism from the time of Saint Paul onward, an argument pursued with
great persuasion recently.78 If religious superiority carried an obliga
tion to convert the heathen, cultural superiority might easily carry an
obligation to convert the barbarian. The belief in this obligation, and
the effort to carry it out, has also been referred to as "conversionism."
Conversionism was broadly dominant in Western imperial thought
during the first half of the nineteenth century, both in France and in
England. In France, the idea of a mission civilisatrice was sporadically
followed by moves toward the cultural assimilation of its subjects
overseas - a policy that resulted in the countervailing notion of negri
tude or black pride.79 In England, one of the most famous statements
of the conversionist point of view is Macaulay's "minute" on Indian
education, and the belief in a conversionist duty spelled out by the
Parliamentary Committee on the Aborigines in 1837.80
Conversionism differed from the later belief in trusteeship in cru
cial ways. It called for missionaries, both cultural and religious, but
not necessarily for conquest or control overseas. The obligation to
spread Christianity and civilization was a self-imposed obligation on
those who thought of themselves as civilized.81 There was no equiva
lent duty or limitation on the rights of the uncivilized. They were not
so often treated as minors in law, but as adults who would choose civi
lization and Christianity voluntarily once it was presented to them.
While a little coercion was called for in some variants, and some po
tential recipients of civilization already lived in European colonies, the
balance of duty lay with the civilizers.82
This, then, is a simple genealogy suggesting that international law
has historically been implicated in drawing cultural, religious, and

77. See generally RICHARD BARBER, THE KN!GHr AND CIDvALRY (1985).
78. See Makau Wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious
Freedom in the African Context, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75 (1999).
79. See Leopold Sedar Senghor, Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth Century, in
THE AFRICA READER: INDEPENDENT AFRICA 179 (Wilfred Cartey & Martin Kilson eds.,
1970).
80. See THOMAS B. MACAULAY, SPEECHES BY LORD MACAULAY, WITH HIS

MlNUTEs ON INDIAN EDUCATION (1935).

81. See Mutua, supra note 78; Mutua, supra note 50.
82. Perhaps the most important British representative of the conversionist position was
Thomas Fowell whose ideas for the civilization of Africa are given in most detail in THE
REMEDY: BEING A SEQUEL TO THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE (1840). His ideas regarding
other parts of the empire appear in the published hearings of the parliamentary committee
on aborigines 1835-37. See PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 1836, vii (538); and vii (425).
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other boundaries to mark out what a state was and what it was not,
and to stake out who was entitled to what protections and who was
not. These notions in tum served to legitimize the spread of "civi
lized" ideas of statehood to those supposedly savage, so that they
could be brought within the history of civilization. Colonialism was
hence justified on exactly this sort of premise.
Although it may be too simplistic to draw analogies between the
contemporary fad of collapsed states (which justifies foreign interven
tion for democracy, human rights, and economic restructuring) and
nineteenth-century international law scholarship on ideas such as terra
nullius and civilization (defined as Western) that justified colonization,
there is nonetheless a continuity of ideas here. There is an undeniable
genealogy in the sense that the idea of collapsed states replicates
nineteenth-century colonial international legal discourse. In fact, as
recently as 1995, a leading international lawyer, Inis Claude, suggested
that a solution to the phenomenon of collapsed states was a return to
the trusteeship system which failed by allowing too many states to
become independent before they were prepared for the responsibili
ties of statehood.83
IV.

SHUTTING OFF THE ILLEGITIMACY/LEGITIMACY OF PRIVATE
ORDERING IN ROTH'S PROPOSAL

Roth, in Chapter Five, explores the legal consequence of non
recognition. He asks: Do de facto regimes have the legal capacity to
enter into binding legal agreements? What is the underlying basis
upon which decisions should be made on the legality of their conduct?
Roth notes that:
By far the most significant international law issues raised by collective
non-recognition of a government concern assertions of the state's rights
against foreign intervention in matters "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction" . . . and against threats or uses of force against the state's
political independence. . . .
The less dramatic issues involve such questions as title to prop
erty. . A related matter is the determination of whether a third party
may lawfully purchase title to state property. . . . [p. 154]
Roth further argues th.at, in the absence of another competing doc
trine, the doctrine of state necessity is a general principle of interna
tional law that may be used for the assessment of the legal significance
.

.

83. See Inis L. Oaude, Jr., The United Nations of the Cold War: Contrib11tions to the
Post-Cold War Situation, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 789, 790, 793 (1995). It is interesting to
note that in 1973 Claude argued that the attention of international law had shifted from the
problem of powerful states to the problems of weak states. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Cen
tral Challenge to the United Nations: Weakening the Strong or Strengthening the Weak?, 14
HARV. INT'L L.J. 517 (1973).
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of acts undertaken by illegitimate regimes (p. 158). This leads him to
another conclusion based on a public/private distinction:

This would suggest . . . that a de facto government would have the legal
capacity to bind the state to treaties of a technical, apolitical nature (e.g.
postal and aeronautical conventions), though not to partisan alliances,
that non-controversial policies or policies consistent with those of previ
ous legitimate governments should enjoy deference from foreign courts
as acts of state . . . . [p. 158]
This clear dichotomy between legal consequences that are public and
controversial and private legal consequences that are less controver
sial is rather troubling for its artificiality. It is based on a rather spuri
ous distinction that suggests that the private sphere is a depoliticized
arena, while the public sphere is a controversial and political arena. It
is as if the private arena eclipses the politics of the public arena so that
we can then think of issues such as property, postal, and aeronautical
conventions as apolitical, while questions relating to collective non
recognition appear to be "dramatic" and presumably very political in
Roth's telling.
Roth here replicates a common mainstream strategy: law, as op
posed to politics, is located in spaces that do not depend on sovereign
control and that are consensual, neutral, and hence effectual. Aero
nautical and postal conventions are, in Roth's view, in this category.
By contrast, Roth locates politics in the controversies surrounding the
desirability of collective nonrecognition - in public intervention in
civil society. This neat dichotomy between political issues and eco
nomic issues is problematic. Its commitment to a depoliticized private
law regime that is presumed to be consensual underplays law's consti
tutive role. Law is constitutive of various choices since there is no
neutral logic inherent in law for justifying one choice over another.
Structuring different market needs or doctrinal forms is illustrative.84
In the area of defining property, for example, choices must be made
about how to balance the absolute freedom of an owner to do as she
wishes with her property with the competing entitlement of her neigh
bor to peaceful and unrestricted use of her property. Making these
choices is inescapably political.85

84. See Karl Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989,
in A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET
ECONOMIES 310 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994).
85. As Kerry Rittich argues:
[T)he distinction between public and private as a way of conceptualizing or resolving the
problems associated with economic reform is unsatisfactory . . . [since] concepts such as
property
tell us nothing about the substantive questions, which are the scope, type and
structure of private interests and power which should be configured. . . . The empowerment
of the "private" actor signals nothing so much as a redistribution of power among different
social groups that the state is prepared to back. This reconfiguration of entitlements and ac
cess to social resources that characterizes restructuring will benefit some people in some
ways, but make others, including those who benefit, worse off in some ways.
• . .
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Dan Tarullo,86 Joel Paul,87 David Kennedy,88 and Amr Shalakany89
argue that politics is equally present in the private realm of aeronauti
cal and postal conventions that Roth dismisses as less dramatic and
therefore apolitical. These scholars have shown in a variety of con
texts the "potential for politics outside the traditional discourses of
public authority."9() Hence:
Defending the stability of a political order necessary for investor confi
dence requires a set of political choices among states and among groups
or classes within nations, as among the transnational interests of labor or
capital or women or men. Moreover, it calls for choices among economic
sectors with stakes in different patterns of modernization, among inves
tors with different stakes in different patterns of production, trade and
consumption. It is commonly said that, for example, that a global market
"requires" an emerging market to enforce the "rule of law" to permit
"transparency" and "predictability" in market transactions. It sounds
very clean, egalitarian, procedural, just like apolitical background rules.
But the alternative is neither arbitrary nor chaotic allocations, but a dif
ferent, and often equally predictable allocation of resources, perhaps to
local rather than foreign investors, to domestic oligarchs rather than for
eign shareholders and vice versa.91
Roth therefore underestimates the politics of private law projecting
rules of private international law as neutral, since, unlike in cases of
collective nonrecognition of governments, sovereignty is at bay in the
private sphere. There is almost blind faith in the idea that public in
tervention in civil society is always coercive, while the exclusivity of
the private sphere from public power guarantees neutrality and there
fore freedom. The power exercised by international financial institu
tions in developing countries, however, especially in the last few years,
to fundamentally alter their labor laws, energy policies, and budgetary
policies, underscores the inherently interventionist and political role of
what is otherwise presented in the rhetoric of apolitical, even-handed

Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender and Distribution in the Legal Struc
tures of Market Reform 258 (1998) (S.J.D. thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the re
quirements of the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, Harvard Law School).
86. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade,
100 HARV. L. REV. 546 (1987).
87. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1991); Joel R.
Paul, The Isolation ofPrivate International Law, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 149 (1988).
88. See David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH
L. REV. 7.
89. Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias
Under the Spectre ofNeo-Liberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L LJ. 419 (2000).
90. Kennedy, supra note 88, at 10-11.
91. David Kennedy, "Background Noise?" The Underlying Politics of Global Govern·
ance, 21 HARV. INT'L REV. 55 (1999). See also David Kennedy, The Disciplines of Interna·
tional Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. OF lNT'L LAW 9 (1999).
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functionality and economic rationality. These alterations to these
economies have resulted in demobilizing political potential for social
justice in areas such as, public provisioning of health care and public
education.92 By contrast, the goals of economic growth and returns to
profits and investments in the allocation of public resources and in de
cisionmaking have been given preferential treatment at the expense of
public provisioning for social justice.93
In addition, to suggest that questions of title to property are not as
controversial in the context of illegitimacy, of governments is to forget
that the entire colonial regime of international law on appropriation of
non-European land was based upon controversial doctrines such as
the doctrine of discovery - a doctrine based on the cultural inferiority
of non-Western land owning and management systems. Again, just as
he presents private issues as apolitical, Roth, in his discussion of colo
nialism, similarly treats culture as invisible in the context of staking
out claims such as colonial expropriations. In the context of collective
nonrecognition of governments, however, culture raises its ugly head
as the rules of public international law grapple to repress and manage
ethnic, religious, and other identity claims.
V.

NONINTERVENTIONISM EXCLUDES INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC D OMINATION

Perhaps there is no better example of Roth's silence on the coer
cion of the private sphere than his discussion of the nonintervention
norm in relation to nonforcible measures undertaken in the promotion
of human rights (pp. 171-72). Roth opines that since there is no
commonly agreed-upon thresholdO of human rights-violative conduct
triggering permissibility of otherwise unlawful measures, let alone
mechanisms for authoritative findings that those thresholds have been
reached in individual cases. . . . This uncertainty is fraught with dangers
for weak, unpopular states at the hands of strong, influential ones, and
one should not automatically assume (as many human rights-oriented
writers often do) that these dangers benefit in any genuine way the cause
of human rights. [pp. 170-71]
This is a point very well-made, yet I find it striking that Roth ignores
an important related question - why do human rights-oriented writ
ers, among others, more often than not tend to presume that the non
intervention norm does not prohibit what have been referred to as
nonforcible measures such as the use of economic leverage?

92 See MEREDETH TURSHEN, PRIVATIZING HEALTH SERVICES IN AFRICA (1999);
Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the Democ
ratization ofDevelopment, 6 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 159, 160 (1993).
93. See Gathii, Representations ofAfrica in Good Governance, supra note 11.
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Although Roth acknowledges economic intervention is an issue, he
is nevertheless moving from within this very limiting framework to the
extent that his concern is which nonforcible economic measures vio
late the nonintervention norm - and he thereby aligns himself with
the overwhelming doctrinal reading of the nonintervention norm as
limited to prohibiting certain interventions in the public sphere of civil
society and in the prohibition of the use of force except in certain cir
cumstances. The failure to read nonintervention as prohibiting eco
nomic coercion underscores the selective reading of the norm of non
intervention by an overwhelming majority of Western public
international lawyers. This prevailing tendency that fails to recognize
economic coercion as a form of intervention follows from a widely
embraced idea in international law that, in the exercise of their eco
nomic freedom, countries do not breach the nonintervention norm.
Consequently, intervention under the United Nations Charter has
largely been limited to restrictions on interference with matters that
are essentially within the jurisdiction of a state, and to the prohibition
of the use of force except in cases where there has been a "threat to
the peace," "breach of the peace," or an "act of aggression."94
There are at least two norms of international law that guide the
definition of the scope of permissible forms of restrictions on eco
nomic interactions between states. In the first view, international law
permits states to impose acts of retorsion on other states. Acknowl
edging the right of a state to impose an act of retorsion follows from
the strict view that each country has a sovereign right not only to de
termine with which countries it may have economic interactions, but
also to impose whatever economic restrictions it wishes on other
states.
The second view holds that, if a norm prohibiting the exercise of
economic coercion between states exists, the exercise of one country's
economic sovereignty against another could be considered a legitimate
reprisal or countermeasure. In other words, although a countermea
sure is an illegal act, if used in self-defense it is deemed legally permis
sible as self-help.95
These norms of international law reveal the absence of a clear
statement restricting the interventionary economic programs pro
moted by powerful states and International Financial Institutions
(IFis).96 This is unsurprising since the nonintervention norm applies to

94. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
95. See OMER ELGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER-MEASURES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1988).
96. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27).
The Court, without much guidance on what it had relied upon, stated that it was unable to
find that United States' measures such as elimination of bilateral assistance, the reduction of
sugar imports, blocking loans from international financial organizations, and ultimately the
prohibition of export/import trade between the two countries and the barring of Nicaraguan
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relations between states rather than between nonstate actors such as
the IFis and states. However, the nonintervention norm reflects in
ternational law's laissez-faire attitude towards economic interactions.
Under this view, only states can legitimately impose restrictions on
relations with each other.97 It is against this background that economic
sanctions are considered legitimate avenues of international· censure,
to discipline what may be considered "errant" states both by individ
ual states and by groups of states through IF!s.98
In addition, an international free-market economy is generally re
garded as enhancing, rather than compromising, international peace
and security.99 This view is not necessarily true in all situations. The
role played by economic restructuring in the violent collapse of the
former Yugoslavia, for example, cannot be understated.100
My point, however, is that the normative authority of the sources
from which the nonintervention norm is derived is a major way by
which international law excludes activities of IFis from its scrutiny.
This happens through the failure to recognize economic coercion as a
violation of the nonintervention norm, since such an argument cannot
be made on the basis of neither custom nor treaty.101
Outside the realm of treaty and custom, however, a number of
United Nations General Assembly resolutions recognize that eco
nomic coercion violates national economic sovereignty and therefore
the nonintervention norm. Legal opinion in many developing counvessels from United States ports, constituted "breach of the customary-law principle of non
intervention." Id. at para. 245.
97. The U.N. Charter provides for the sovereign equality of all states. U.N. CHARTER
art. 2, para. 1. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States explicitly extends the
meaning of sovereignty to incorporate the idea of economic independence. Chapter 1 (b)
provides: "Economic as well as political and other relations among States shall be governed,
inter alia, by the following principles . . . sovereign equality of all states." Charter of Eco
nomic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3821, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at
50, U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974).
98. There is also a view that, as a practical matter, much of a typical state's international
trade involves a form of coercion. See, e.g., D.W. Bowett, International Law and Economic
Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 248 (1976). But see Tom Farer, Political and Economic Coer
cion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1985). Farer argues that
taking into account the at best inconclusive character of the definitional exercise [under Ar
ticle 2(4) of the U.N. Charter], the clear language of the Declaration of Friendly Relations,
the earlier General Assembly resolution on nonintervention prohibiting "measures of an
economic and compelling character to force the will of the State" and taking into account as
well the language of the O.A.S. Charter, I conclude that under some conceivable conditions,
economic coercion can be a violation of international law even where the means employed
do not themselves violate any treaty.

Id. at 411.
99. See Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions
after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L LJ. 443 (1997).
100. See id.; SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY:
AFTER THE COLD WAR 148 (1995).
101.

CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION

See STATIITE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(1 )(c)

.
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tries shares this interpretation of the nonintervention norm under Ar
ticle 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. This argument is further for
tified by the view that economic coercion is prohibited under Article
2(4) of the UN Charter, since it constitutes a violation of the prohibi
tion on unlawful threat or use of force.102
This interpretation of the nonintervention norm is primarily de
rived from the following United Nations General Assembly resolu
tions:
•

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst States in Accor
dance with the Charter of the United Nations;103

•

Resolution of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources;104

•

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.105

The dominant interpretation given to the nonintervention norm, how
ever, holds that international law does not necessarily recognize a
norm prohibiting economic coercion. Why is this so?
International legal opinion, especially in the West, does not regard
economic coercion as intervention, since the definition of intervention
contained in treaties and custom does not include economic coercion.
On this view, international law excludes economic coercion as a part
of the nonintervention norm, since it restricts the sources of the nonin
tervention norm to treaty and custom. This excludes as sources of in
ternational law United Nations General Assembly resolutions that de
clare that economic coercion constitutes a part of the nonintervention
norm. This position is upheld on the assumption that the United Na
tions General Assembly does not have legislative authority to enact
international law. As such, its resolutions cannot be regarded as
authoritative sources of international law. This is especially the case
when there are objections to the resolutions on the assembly floor. In
addition, the resolutions are neither evidence of treaties nor state

102. See Bhupinder Chimni, Towards A Third World Approach to Non-Intervention:
Through the Labyrinth ofWestern Doctrine, 20 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 243, 255 (1980).
103. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc A/6220 (1965).
This declaration fortifies the 1965 General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 290 (IV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess.,
at 13, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 13 (1949). Paragraph 2 of this latter declaration provides: "No
state may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type of measures to
coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sover
eign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind." The former calls upon states to re
frain from "any forcible action" that deprives people of self-determination, equal rights, and
freedom and independence. It further provides that "armed intervention and all other forms
of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its politi
cal, economic, and cultural elements, are in violation of international law."
104. G.A. Res. 2635, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 126, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
105. G.A. Res. 3821, supra note 97, at 50.
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practice evidencing custom.106 This is the position Roth takes in sub
scribing to the view that the New International Economic Order did
not rise to the status of international law (p. 168).107
An alternative view, however, regards General Assembly resolu
tions recognizing economic coercion as embodying a normative source
of binding international law.108 According to this view, General As
sembly resolutions can result in more rapid formation of norms than
would occur through the regular process of development of "interna
tional custom" or the strict formality of a specific international con
vention or treaty.109 The advantage of admitting new sources that
permit greater expedition in formation of international legal norms is
that it enhances the ability of the United Nations to deal with new or
unanticipated developments.U0
There is in fact a legal basis for admitting General Assembly reso
lutions as sources of international law. Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice specifies a source of international
law other than treaty and custom: general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.111 For example, expanding sources through gen
eral principles of international law, it has been argued, constitutes a
source of norms of human rights law.112 Some jurists have argued that
the Article 38(1)(c) source of international law was written with an
106. On the legal significance of United Nations General Assembly resolutions and po
litical statements, see Richard Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General As
sembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966); Rosalyn Higgins, The United Nations and Law Mak
ing: The Political Organs, 64 AM. J. INT'LL. 37 (1970).
107. The New International Economic Order was an effort initiated by developing
countries for, inter alia, the restructuring of international economic relations to establish a
balance between their predominantly raw-material-producing economies and Western in
dustrial and now increasingly service-oriented economies.
108. See, e.g., NICO SCHRINER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL REsOURCES (1997);
see also B.S. Chimni, The Principle ofPermanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: To
ward a Radical Interpretation, 38 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 208, 214 (1998) (review of NICO
SCHRUVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL REsOURCES). Chimni argues that, to appreci
ate the principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, one has to look to the
material, rather than the formal and statist interpretations, of international law. Under this
view, it is evident that third-world countries, since 1975, have abandoned nationalist bour
geois projects such as those relating to PSNR because those projects participate within the
oppressive and neocolonial international legal system. Under this system, the rights of for
eign investors and foreign capital are heavily protected at the expense of the developing
countries' ability to use their resources to expand the welfare of their citizens and protect the
rights of the victims of transnational capital activities. See generally B.S. Cm:MNI, IN
TERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES
(1993).
109. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 1-148.
110. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 547
(1993).
111. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(1)(c).
112 See Bruno Sintma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom,
Jus Cogens and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 82 (1992).
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aim of preventing the International Court of Justice from basing rul
ings upon subjective principles of justice. Such a broad power, ac
cording to this prevailing opinion, would inject subjectivity into the
sources of international law and would be mistrusted by govern
ments.113 Yet, subjectivity is perhaps the staple food of legal argu
ment, even in the adjudicative context, since gaps, contradictions, and
ambiguities inexorably require judges to make choices.114 In addition,
even the so-called objective sources of international law, such as cus
tom, have been invoked to legitimate bullying, such as the U.S. inva
sion of Panama.U5
The nonintervention norm can be and has been construed to the
effect that economic coercion violates it. This interpretation is unsur
prisingly held widely in third-world international legal and political
opinion. During the 1960s and 1970s, third-world majorities on the
floor of the General Assembly dominated the debate and resolution
process.116 It was during this period that a number of resolutions call
ing for prohibition of economic coercion were passed. The over
whelming response of Western countries, including the United States,
was that United Nations General Assembly resolutions were not a
source of international law. Another response was to acknowledge
these resolutions as merely soft law since they failed to command a
sufficient level of legality. The ostensible reason for this was that
there was relatively little international consensus over them.117

113. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 15-16 (4th
ed. 1990). Brownlie notes that Article 38(1)(c) of the Statue of the International Court of
Justice has been used sparingly for rules of evidence, rules of procedure, or jurisdictional
questions. Brownlie argues that Article 38(1)(c) was never intended to be the basis of ma
jor, new substantive norms in international law. See also Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy
of the Sources ofInternational Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273 (1974-75). Akehurst argues
that general principles of international law are not a source of international law, but rather
"simply broad principles, such as the principle of diplomatic immunity or the principle of the
freedom of the seas; most of them are principles of customary international law
" Id. at
278.
. . • .

114. See KENNEDY, supra note 51, at 1.
115. See Antony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyr
anny, 84 AM. J. INT'LL. 516 (1990).
1 16. See Richard Falk, Introduction, The American Attack on the United Nations: An
Interpretation, 16 HARV. J. INT'L L. 566, 568 (1975); see also Progressive Development of the
Principles and Norms of International Law Relating to the New International Economic Or
der, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Agenda Item 5, at 4, U.N. Doc A/39/504/Add.1 (1984) (pro
viding a good example of an argument in favor of taking general assembly resolutions as a
source of international law); Farer, supra note 98, at 408 (defining economic coercion as "ef
forts to project influence across frontiers by denying or conditioning access to a country's
resources, raw materials, semi- or finished products, capital, technology, services or consum
ers").
117. This bifurcation of legal claims (representing the status quo) on the one hand, and
moral claims or soft law (deviations from the status quo or challenges to it) on the other
hand, can be argued as reflecting a liberal strategy for perpetuating an unjust status quo by
adopting the political posture that opposing claims may in time become legal principles
when they attain or command a sufficient level of legality.
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My argument, then, is that the contemporary understanding of the
nonintervention norm subscribed to by Roth is limited to the extent
that sources of international law are restricted to treaty and custom.
This selective recognition of the sources of international law excludes
economic coercion as part of our understanding of unjustified inter
vention under the nonintervention norm. The focus on the source of
international law's normative authority limits a broader or expansive
definition of the nonintervention norm that accommodates economic
coercion much in the same way that it bars interference with matters
that are essentially within the jurisdiction of a state or the unlawful use
of force. International law's normative authority is determined by the
doctrine of sources through which international law defines what does
or does not become a new norm. Consequently, in limiting new norms
to custom and treaty rather than to general principles, for example, in
ternational law in effect perpetuates the status quo and preempts any
radical rereading or reconfiguration of its norms in favor of develop
ing countries.118
In so doing, the nonintervention norm protects the agenda of pow
erful and wealthy countries and nonstate actors, such as the IFis,
which currently fundamentally redefine third-world countries by vir
tue of their economic leverage over them.119 In that way, international
legal norms are decontextualized from the lived realities of peoples
around the world - international law then remains a formal but a
formidable mechanism for parceling out competences without regard
to their material or distributional implications.12°
As seen by its Western interlocutors, international law is, and
should remain, deeply committed to ensuring that the international
political economy is safeguarded from all forms of redistributive inter
ventionism that would interfere with the automatic progress, dyna-

118. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INfERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (1979). Bedjaoui notes that international law
must thus accept the challenge being made to it both by the structural disorder of the world
economy and by the deeply felt desire of all peoples for a new international economic order.
However, it is perfectly clear that to satisfy such hopes and to meet the needs of the interna
tional community seeking for this new order, international law cannot properly and effec
tively and effectively undertake its own transformation if it confines itself to its traditional
sources alone, i.e. custom, treaties and general legal principles. The inadequacy of the tradi
tional ways of forming the rules of international law is very sharply felt at the present time.
What is to done if not to make use of other sources?

Id. at 128.
119.

See Cahn, supra note 92, at 159-60.

120. Antony Carty is critical of approaches to international law that decontextualize in
ternational law from its historical and material specificity. See ANTONY CARTY, THE
DECAY OF INfERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL
IMAGINATION IN lNfERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4 (1986) . For a Marxist take, see B.S. Chimni,
Marxism and International Law: A Contemporary Analysis, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 6,
1999, at 337.
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mism, and productivity of the market.121 While it therefore seems that
international law has a well-articulated defense against redistributive
interventionism inimical to free markets, it is hostile to accommodat
ing a countervailing optic that would examine the distributional costs
of the market's inability to spread its goodies around efficiently, opti
mally, or even equitably. In doing so, international law reinforces the
fallacious vision of a universal economic order operating on more or
less automatic self-regulating lines, while simultaneously de
legitimating the power and authority of the nation-state 1) to protect
its citizens from want through regulatory controls such as interest
rates, taxes, and subsidies, and 2) to tame the inexorable march of the
market so that a balance between social spending and investment pro
grams could be entrusted to the hands of govemment.122
VI. ROTH BREAKS DOWN POST-COLD WAR LINEAR STORIES ON
BREAKDOWN OF SOVEREIGNTY
Notwithstanding these implications of Roth's neoconservatism, an
important outcome of his analysis is the effort to transcend the debate
in liberal international theory in the post-Cold War period that has fo
cused on legitimating the telling of a linear and unidimensional tale:
the classical conception of sovereignty as a consolidated and unified
unit formalizing the boundary between the national and the interna
tional has broken down or is breaking down or is in the process of ero
sion and reformulation.123 Consequently, and on this view, states can
no longer justify repression of individual rights on the basis of their
exclusive sovereignty within their domestic jurisdictions as they did in

121. See Norbert Horn, Normative Problems ofa New International Economic Order, 16
J. WORLD TRADE L. 338, 343 (1982). Horn observes that the New International Economic
Order (NIEO) wrongly sought to extend the legal concept of sovereignty to economic as
pects. Similarly, Schwarzenberger argues that the ideology of the Principle of Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources was no more than a "convenient para-legal ideology of
power economics." See Chimni, The Principle ofPermanent Sovereignty, supra note 108, at
208 (describing Schrijver rejecting this view).
Robert Jackson argues that the NIEO "was unduly ambitious in that it attempted to re
place free trade and cumulative justice with economic democracy and distributive justice."
ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
THE THIRD WORLD 202 (1991).
122. I tell this story in James Thuo Gathii, Empowering the Poor While Protecting the
Powerful: A Critique of Good Governance Proposals (1999) (unpublished S.J.D. disserta
tion, Harvard Law School) (on file with the author).
123. It is noteworthy that the theme of the decline and demise of sovereignty is not con
fined to the post-Cold War period. See, e.g., RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY:
THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971) (arguing that the nation-state
was destroyed by the multinational enterprise); see also ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 220 (1975); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE,
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLmCS IN TRANsmoN 3 (1977); Saul
Mendlovitz, On the Creation of a Just World Order: An Agenda for a Program of Inquiry
and Praxis, Vol. 8 ALTERNATIVES, (Winter, 1980-1981).
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the 1960s and 1970s.124 The new democratic entitlement that Roth
takes issue with holds that, under the post-Cold War international or
der, individual liberty or the sovereign individual is the ultimate
source of legitimacy in the liberal democratic order of good govern
ance.
Roth seeks to break this unidimensional telling by examining the
emergence of what he suggests to be a new norm - governmental il
legitimacy of international law. This new norm, according to Roth,
challenges the classical understandings of sovereignty that the demo
cratic entitlement school (which he discredits) also challenges. The
purpose of the book is therefore that of subjecting "collective non
recognition of governments to painstaking and systematic examina
tion," which the author states is "underexplored and undertheorized
as a question in international law" (p. xi). In international legalese,
the question that Roth sets out to answer is "when is a de facto
authority to be considered a government for the purpose of interna
tional law?"125 His aim is "to reach a conclusion on the 'current state
of the positive international law of governmental illegitimacy. ' "126
Roth's project may therefore be summarized as a persuasion for bal
ancing, if not blunting, the moralism of the democratic entitlement as
the basis of government legitimacy with the reality of a norm of gov
ernmental illegitimacy based on interpretations of de facto control.127
The resulting balance, perhaps more inclined in favor of de facto con
trol, offers the lowest common denominator for governmental legiti
macy in a world of plural cultures and societies. To illustrate:
124. See Gregory Fox, New Approaches to International Human Rights: The Sovereign
State Revisited, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 105 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 1997). Fox notes that "international law no longer
permits states to defend violations of fundamental human rights as legitimate exercises of
national sovereignty." Id. at 115.
125. P. xv. This reference comes from the foreword authored by Oscar Schachter
[hereinafter, Schachter Foreword].
126. P. xvi (Schachter Foreword).
127. Roth accepts the "the increased significance of empirical manifestations of popular
will in ad hoc evaluations of governmental legitimacy, but denies that this development en
tails the emergence of a liberal-democratic 'legitimism.' " P. 4. Similarly, in discussing the
constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition, Roth argues that
some concession to the realpolitik of international relations is essential if international law is
to be taken seriously as a framework for actual state behavior, as opposed to mere wishful
moralizing on the part of natural law theorists. . . . [I]n order for there to be the necessary
unity of legal and factual relationships, brute force must be permitted to create and destroy
legal relationships, but not limitlessly."

P. 125. Roth, however, is also of the view "that international law's moralistic component
is essential to its very efficacy." P. 182. Yet, it is also Roth's view that "the prospect of a
new democratic legitirnism replacing the effective control doctrine . . . [would result in]
radically transforming the sovereign equality scheme." P. 189. Roth further opines that
the effective control doctrine, "though not by itself rising to the level ofjus cogens, is the
present method for interpreting a scheme that features as a peremptory norm the inad
missibility of the use of force against the political independence of states." P. 189.
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[A]s the actors to be reckoned with in the international system become
more numerous and come to represent more diverse interests, interna
tional law norms come under increasing pressure to embody truly gen
eral principles rather than a fortuitous overlap of the interests of a pow
erful few. . . . The moralistic rules calculated to legitimate the essence of
the status quo generate, paradoxically, standards that progressively en
croach on the prerogatives of the powerful. This is not to say that inter
national law has become a strictly moral order. . . . It is, however, to deny
the irrelevance of moralistic standards to international relations, and
thus to deny that any pragmatic account of international law takes the
legitimacy of de facto power as a given. [p. 10]
Roth's narrative is not one of a simplistic ossification of the classical
doctrines of sovereignty and nonintervention, and progress towards a
nirvana in which protection of individual rights of self-determined in
dividuals has superceded the constraints imposed by the reification of
the state and of state sovereignty. It is a project that seeks to infuse a
sense of moralism into one of international law's touchstones - sov
ereignty. Rather than understanding sovereignty as a dry, amoral
safeguard of statism, Roth reads popular sovereignty into this classical
understanding of sovereignty. The location of sovereignty therefore
moves from the state to the people. In this sense, therefore, Roth's
narrative flirts with the contemporary fascination of progress that
traces the upending of classical sovereignty by popular sovereignty not
so surreptitiously.128 Roth delves into political theory, jurisprudence
and constitutionalism, and a variety of cases to demonstrate that in
ternational legal scholarship has failed to acknowledge that, while it
may be true that legitimation of governance is today increasingly
moving towards the ideal of the will of the people, governmental ille
gitimacy is perhaps better determined by realism (whether a govern
ment has de facto control as an indication of the acquiescence or will

128. Pp. 11-15. Roth su=arizes what he calls the "progression of legal standards regarding the legitimacy. . ." P. 11. Here is a classic example of this progression rendition:
.

Two conceptual transformations thus paradoxically result from enshrining sovereignty in
law, i.e. from the pursuit of peace based on the legal inviolability of the territorial integrity
and political independence of recognized states. The first is a reconceptualization of the
elemental units of the international system as, not territorial units or state apparatuses, but
political communities or 'peoples', defined pragmatically as the inhabitants of relatively sta
ble (even if coercive) political entities. State apparatuses are taken to be the expressions of
those political communities, and their territorial claims are the claims of the communities
they are thought to represent. Theoretically, then, state sovereignty is popular sovereignty,
though the state apparatus may in most circumstances be irrebuttably presumed to represent
the people over whom it exercises de facto control. Second, sovereignty itself no longer en
tails absolute discretion on matters within the domestic jurisdiction, as states are pressured
to consent to obligations regarding the treatment of groups within their territories.

P. 12 (citations omitted). This narrative embodies progression to the extent to which it
sees "sovereignty as part of some linear evolution of history, destined for the rise, pre
eminence and eventual fall as if mirroring the progression of the seasons." Mark Owen
Lombardi, Third-World Problem-Solving and the 'Religion' of Sovereignty: Trends and
Prospects, in MARK E. DENHAM & MARK OWEN LOMBARDI, PERSPECTIVES ON THIRD
WORLD SOVEREIGNTY: THE POST MODERN PARADOX 153 (1996).
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of the people) than by idealism (the fact that the will of the people has
been expressed through their exercise of participatory rights by voting
- or expressing their sovereignty - in a government of their choice
as guaranteed by international human rights conventions).
Roth is therefore skeptical of the increasing importance of individ
ual rights and self-determination internationally, which "appear to
point to liberal democracy as the basis for a norm of governmental le
gitimacy"129 - a view with which he expresses great discomfort.130 In
brief, Roth seems to suggest that the increasing importance of the will
of the people in legitimation of governments is mistakenly seen to be
the result of conceptual developments by proponents of the new
democratic entitlement norm. Roth disputes this reading of interna
tional law by predicating it less on the conceptual developments of the
sovereignty doctrine and more on the "principle of governmental ille
gitimacy."
Governmental illegitimacy is not necessarily a liberal democratic
notion. Roth traces notions of governmental illegitimacy as much to
Rousseau as to Locke, the result of which is to discredit any preemi
nence of liberal democracy over other sources of governmental legiti
macy such as those within revolutionary dictatorships as in the East.
In fact, Roth argues that the principle of governmental illegitimacy
preceded the presumed developments of the sovereignty doctrine. As
the forward to the book notes, the fact that the principle of govern
mental illegitimacy came prior to the emergence of the democratic en
titlement cannot be denied.131 Roth discusses how collective denial of
recognition primarily on the basis that such regimes lacked effective
control over their territories - rather than on the basis that such re
gimes failed to pass the contemporary litmus test of reflecting the "will
of the people" through popular elections - indicates that the princi
ple of governmental illegitimacy may have matured into a new norm.
Roth interprets failure to recognize governments for failing to have

129. P. xvi (Schachter Foreword).
130. Similar views have been expressed by critical legal scholars as well as anti
colonially inclined third-world scholars. See e.g., Obiora Okafor, Is there a Legitimacy Defi
cit in International Legal Scholarship and Practice, 13 !NT'L INSIGHTS 91 (1997); Obiora C.
Okafor, The Concept of Legitimate Governance in the Contemporary International Legal
System, 44 NETHERLANDS INT'L L.R. 33 (1997); Nathaniel Berman, The Paradoxes of Le
gitimacy: Case Studies in International Legal Modernism, 32 HARV. !NT'L L.J. 583 (1991)
(book review); Obiora Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimacy: International Law, Multilateral
Institutions and the Question of Socio-Cultural Fragmentation Within African States (1998)
(thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy of Law, University of British Columbia). For an overview of several
perspectives, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Process of Legitimation and the Le
gitimacy of Global Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. lNT'L. & COMP. L. 117; Quashigah, supra note
22. For a particularly insightful summary of the limitations and paradoxes of legitimacy as
an emerging touchstone of both political and legal debate, see Karin Mickleson, Afterword:
Challenging Legitimacy, in LEGIDMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA, supra note 22, at 559.
131. P. xvii (Schachter Foreword).
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effective control over their territory as being consistent with the no
tion of the will of the people. In Roth's view, the requirement that a
government have effective control over its people in order to be rec
ognized reflects "a principled respect for the decision of the people to
acquiesce in the regime."132
Roth's assertion that de facto control can be construed as a reflec
tion of the will of the people is one of the most important arguments
he advances to debunk the overdetermination of the moralism of the
democratic entitlement school. Roth seems to marry the moral ideal
ism of the democratic entitlement school with his own brand of real
ism - in effect blunting the liberal triumphalism of the post-Cold War
period.
Although Roth's analysis proceeds from the premise that a gov
ernment that does not reflect the will of the people is illegitimate in
international law, he is skeptical of proposing an enforceable legal
norm - he is worried that if a norm of governmental illegitimacy were
acknowledged, it would soon fall into disrepute, since its potential for
abuse would be so great. This makes Roth look like a conservative
realist - one not ready to give too much weight to idealistic criteria
for the determination of the legitimacy of governments. For example,
Roth notes that such a norm would be used to deny (nondemocratic)
governments legitimacy on the basis of a liberal democratic creed that
is not widely shared in today's "pluralist international society of di
verse cultures and histories."133 Roth is worried that such a norm
would also give powerful countries a basis for justified international
intervention, a prospect for which Roth has no patience. In fact, per
haps Roth's biggest opposition from liberal internationalists will be his
argument in favor of the continued relevance of de facto control as an
indicator of governmental legitimacy. The effort of the book in pro
posing a new law on governmental illegitimacy then seems to falter
once the author acknowledges its futility or disutility as a predictable
norm.
For this reason, the argument that a new norm on governmental
illegitimacy would be so susceptible to abuse as to render it unpredict
able should be no surprise to Roth. Yet, Roth wants to make it look
like a perplexing or even vexing proposition to the extent that it would
have no consensus among states. Roth's perplexity and vexation seem
to arise from his commitment to the idea that "almost all states large and small, rich and poor, strong and weak - accept [many] of
[the] normative . . . core principles embodied in the United Nations
Charter and repeated without deviation in a multitude of treaties and
declarations" (p. 6). Agreeing with Hedley Bull, Roth emphasizes

132. P. xvii (Schachter Foreword).
133. P. xviii (Schachter Foreword).
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that, where a violation of these principles occurs, " 'the offending state
usually goes out of its way to demonstrate that it considers itself (and
other states) bound by the rule in question.' "134 In Roth's view, most
states conduct their affairs on the basis of certain accepted principles
(referred to variously as principles, rules, and norms) as a "common
reference point" (p. 7). Notwithstanding these observations about the
pervasiveness of a core set of commitments for the maintenance of in
ternational peace and security after the Second World War, Roth still
has an overbearing impatience with the liberal triumphalist reification
of the "will of the people" as a new locus of the legitimacy of states in
sofar as it fails to accommodate the reality of whether or not such a
government has effective control or the acquiescence of its people.
Yet, although Roth is critical of the democratic entitlement school
for its idealism, his conception of the will of the people is not different
from that of his identified nemesis - proponents of the new demo
cratic entitlement. For Roth, sovereignty is transformed. It "is now
popular sovereignty, predicated on the principle of self-determination
of peoples, and qualified sovereignty, limited by an increasing list of
international obligations . . . pertaining to the treatment of subjects"
(p. 14). This view of sovereignty as the new basis of legitimacy for
governments is based neither entirely on the liberal internationalist
argument of the ascendancy of international treaty norms of citizen
participation in elections, nor on the realism of a government with de
facto control of its territory. Yet, insofar as Roth also predicates his
view of legitimacy on popular sovereignty or self-determination of a
people (as may be evidenced by their submission or acquiescence to a
government of their choice), his proposal of a norm of illegitimacy of
governments is the reverse of those arguing in favor of a democratic
entitlement for citizens. Both Roth and his antagonists are all for the
same thing - to decenter sovereignty from its state centricism by re
interpreting it as popular sovereignty or self-determination of peoples.
Roth is the flip side of the liberal internationalists, since he de
emphasizes the moral commitments of the International Bill of Rights
as the source of legitimacy or illegitimacy for governments (his em
phasis lies in construing sovereignty from whether a government has
de facto control over its people, for example),135 but he is nevertheless

134. P. 6 {footnote omitted). Hedley Bull, an Australian political scientist, is one of the
leading thinkers in international relations. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCIDCAL SOCIETY
(1977); Hedley Bull, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in DIPLOMATIC IN
VESTIGATIONS 35 (H. Butterfield & M. Wight eds., 1968).
135. Roth states this position as follows:
[T]he concept of "self determination of peoples" that underlies sovereignty is increasingly
interpreted in the context of the international obligations that qualify sovereignty. The in
ternational community has come to understand a "people" less as an abstraction, the bearer
of a unitary will authoritatively expressed by whatever state apparatus of domestic origin ex
erts de facto control over the territory, and more as a collection of persons possessing a right
to participate in determining their own form of government, a right that the state apparatus
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committed to a norm of illegitimacy predicated on people rather than
states as the source of sovereignty (p. 170).
One reason why Roth is unable to reconcile his proposal of a new
law of illegitimacy of governments with the possibility of its potential
abuse arises from his observation that it is impossible to reconcile the
liberal commitment to the "will of the people" with the reality of one
party states and dictatorships - even in the post-Cold War liberal era
(pp. 72-73). This factual detail, the inconsistency of desired norm and
actual praxis, is then one of his most important points of departure in
finding his proposed norm inadequate.
VII. ROTH ON STATEHOOD: WHAT OF THE NATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
After rehashing the "well-rehearsed"136 debate on constitutive and
declaratory theories of recognition, Roth defines statehood:

A state is essentially a political community (within whatever territorial
boundaries) that existing states collectively decide ought to be self
goveming. True, agreement on this 'ought' is most likely to be found
where that political community (within those boundaries) has been self
goveming in the recent past, both because the peace and security sys
tem's status quo orientation naturally leads it to champion the immediate
status quo ante and because no alternative principles are likely to find
consensus. Yet where agreement can be founded on another basis, such
as the widely perceived illegitimacy of overseas colonialism and undesir
ability of fragmentation, the result is not different in kind. [p.131; foot
note omitted]
In Roth's view, the state is a doctrinal entity. It is a political commu
nity. It must be stripped of any ethnic, religious, or other affective es
sence. The condition sine qua non for its exercise of state power is a
government or an apparatus exercising state power within it (p. 130).
Roth does not consider it necessary to recognize what Antony Carty
has identified as "the institutional, cultural (national) and ideological
dimensions of the State,"137 since he adopts a formal view of the state
that is decontextualized and ahistorical. He abstracts the state from
the nation, despite the fact that the two have been almost inseparable

is obliged to respect and effectuate. It is this phenomenon that has caused some observers
(mistakenly, in my view) to identify the developing norm of popular sovereignty with liberal
democracy.
Pp. 14-15.
136. See Karen Knop, The 'Righting' of Recognition: Recognition of States in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, in State Sovereignty: The Challenge of a Changing World,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INT'L L., Oct. 15-17, 1992, at 36, 3841.
137. Antony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of Interna
tional Law, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 82 (1991).
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over the last century.138 In the nineteenth century, European states
created nations.139 In the twentieth century, one may argue that na
tions have more often than not claimed to have a right to their own
states. Self-determination came to be understood as a means of deal
ing with the backwardness exemplified by the violence of nationalism,
particularly in Africa and Asia.140 States would usher these tribal so
cieties into modernity, and move them away from and beyond tradi
tion.
Nationalism, in the variety of its guises, suggests a consistent ten
dency to equate the boundaries of government with the state. In one
of its Eurocentric guises, nationalism has it that a necessary condition
of free institutions is that the boundaries of government should coin
cide with those of nationalities.141 There are perhaps similarities that
can be traced between European and non-European nationalism: the
presumption that nationalism supplies the determination of the unit of
population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own; that hu
manity is divided into nations by virtue of certain characteristics that
can be ascertained and are exclusively inherent in it and that is the
only legitimate form of self-determination (hence each nation is dis
tinct from another culturally, linguistically, and in other outward sym
bols of life); the requirement of uniformity and enforcement of belief
policy/goals/values among members; and preoccupation with a glori
ous past and a more glorious future, where past greatness is appealed
to in order to warrant subversion of present and existing institutions,
hence past greatness is related to present degradation.142
By resorting to a legalistic conception of the state, Roth under
plays how nationalism in postcolonial societies is so central to under
standing these countries. In a historical perspective, it is pertinent to
observe that European imperialism in non-Western societies in the
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries coincided with the height of
the nationalist moment in Europe. That Roth therefore underplays

138. Roth, however, discusses in passing how attribution of a unitary will within a coun
try with minorities clainiing statehood has posed a problem in international law. He attrib
utes international law's inability to address this problem to its tendency to confer on mem
bers of groups individual rights while leaving intact the sovereignty of the larger political
communities within which these minorities find themselves. P. 194.
139. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); ERIC HOBSBAWM,
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1990); ANTIIONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC
ORIGINS OF NATIONS (1986). For a critique of the Eurocentric approaches to the study of
Nationalism, see Gopal Balakrishnan, The National Imagination, in BALAKRISHNAN GOPAL
& BENEDICT ANDERSON, MAPPING TIIE NATION (1996) and DAWA NORBU, CULTURE
AND TIIE PoLmcs OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM (1992).
140. See ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM 25-30 (3d ed. 1966).
141. See John Stuart Mill, Considerations of Representative Government, quoted in
Benedict Anderson, Mapping the Nation, in MAPPING TIIE NATION, supra note 139.
142 See KEDOURIE, supra note 140, at 70-71, 84-85, 105-06.
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the idea of the nation in his analysis of states and governments is tell
ing for both European and non-European societies.
Nationalism, like narratives about legitimacy of governments, is
regarded as an invention of Europe and therefore a mark of European
achievement.143 Imperialism and colonial occupation were thought
morally justifiable under this discourse of European identity, since
being non-European was equated with being backward, primitive, and
prehistoric.144 Non-European societies were therefore regarded as fal
ling outside the purview of nations enjoying certain values specific to
Europe.145 The imperial civilizing mission laid the basis for justifying
European trusteeship, guardianship, and protection of non-Europeans
on the basis that differences needed a formal framework to be aligned
with the ideal of European experience.
Consequently, Tocqueville, writing on genocidal expeditions ac
companied by expropriation of land undertaken by the French against
Muslim Algerians, saw it necessary to bring "prosperity based on
peace, regardless of how that peace is obtained."146 The colonizing
European countries regarded themselves as only having duties of re
specting the independence and nationality of other "civilized" na
tions.147 These duties did not extend towards those to whom national
ity and independence were evil or questionable goods.148
The account of nationalism and its coincidence with imperialism is
vividly illustrated in the scramble for Africa, a competitive episode of
European imperialism to apportion Africa into spheres of influence
between themselves. The loyalty and patriotism that nationalism
evoked in this competitive episode demonstrates how the liberal aspi
rations upon which the civilizing mission was purportedly grounded
were vitiated by its arrogance and preoccupations with racial and
other forms of Western/European superiority.149 The veneration of
national culture and pride were thus the altar at which colonialism was
executed.
143. See, e.g., KEDOURIE, supra note 140; HANS KOHN, NATIONALISM: ITS MEANING
AND HISTORY 9-11 (1975). By contrast, Edward Said cites Eric Hobsbawm as observing that
Palestinian nationalism was created by "the common experience of Zionism settlement and
conquest." See Edward Said, Nationalism, Human Rights and Interpretation, in FREEDOM
AND INTERPRETATION: THE OXFORD AMNESTY 192 (Barbara Johnson ed., 1993).
144. See Gyan Prakash, Introduction, in AFrER COLONIALISM: IMPERIAL HISTORIES
AND POSTCOLONIAL DISPLACEMENTS 3 (Gyan Prakash ed., 1995); SAID, supra note 6, at
40-49.
145. See Annelise Riles, Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and
the Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723 (1993).
146. Melvin Ritcher, Tocqueville on Algeria, 25 REV. POL. 362, 384-85 (1963) (citation
omitted).
147. See GROVOGUI, supra note 59, at 120-22.
148. See 3 JOHN S. MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 167-68 (1865).
149. See KEDOURIE, supra note 140, at 83.
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This account departs from regardiµg nationalism solely as a prod
uct of a European experience and instead focuses on its location at the
intersection with the height of the discourse of national identity in
Europe and colonialism. Hence, the encounter between Europe and
the colonial world reveals the cultural connotations embedded in par
ticular interpretations of nationalism. Nationalism also plays a role in
erasing from the national memory the plunder and pain of imperial
rule. For example, in the U.S. and in former colonial powers, nation
alism erases the imperial past and repaints it in the golden color, de
cor, and splendor of the political doctrine of popular sovereignty,
equal opportunity, and self-governance - the leader of the free
world.150
Roth's separation of state and nation in his debate on legitimacy
and illegitimacy of governments underestimates the significance of na
tionalism in postcolonial societies. For example, African states were
arbitrarily parceled out among colonizing European powers in the
nineteenth century without regard to the reality on the ground. Con
sequently, a nation of Somali peoples ended up in two juridical states,
Kenya and Somalia. Similarly, the Maasai nations were split between
Tanzania and Kenya.151 This arbitrary parcelization of Africa resulted
in the imposition of artificial states resulting in what Makau Wa
Mutua has called a "crisis of internal legitimacy":

I contend that foreign imposition of artificial states and their continued
entrapment within the concepts of statehood and sovereignty are sure to
occasion the extinction of Africa unless those sacred cows are set aside
for now to disassemble African states and reconfigure them. I propose
that pre-colonial entities within the post-colonial order be allowed to ex
ercise their right to self-determination. Only this radical but necessary
step can legitimize the African state and avoid its demise.152
Mutua's point is not merely the literal redrawing of the African map,
but rather that attention must be paid "to African political and cul
tural heritage if [the state] is to attain any legitimacy with broad sec
tors of the people."153 Hence, the legitimacy of the state in Africa ac
cording to Mutua is precarious, since its imposition has no roots
among the African people. Some of the elements that constitute this
kind of roots include reconsidering the relationship between the indi
vidual and the state, and redefining the relationship of the state with
international capital in a way that captures the integrity of the African

150. See Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body
{1997).

as

Fetish Object, 76

OR.

L. REV. 457

151. See Makau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal In
quiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'LL. 1118, 1119 {1995).
152 Id. (footnote omitted).
153. Id. at 1118, n.12.
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state.154 These conceptions of legitimate statehood go beyond the ju
ridical statehood that characterizes so many states in Africa today,
since they are contextualized within actual circumstances.
Why is juridical statehood so removed from context in Africa? Is
it because this conception is Eurocentric in its origins? Abstract in its
character? Imposed by colonial rule? These are all questions begging
for an answer, and the extent to which Governmental Illegitimacy skips
these questions is telling, especially because there has for some time
now been a burgeoning literature in international law and relations on
these very questions.155
So far, I have made the claim that Roth's failure to consider the
question of the nation, and therefore nationalism as well, confines le
gitimacy to very narrow questions of legality divorced from existing
reality. I have also argued that, at the height of nationalist moment in
Europe, European imperialism in non-Western societies was also at its
height. In essence, although some see a discontinuous history between
European and non-European colonialism,156 there are striking conti
nuities between them, especially with reference to the place of the na
tion.157

154. See id. at 1175-76.
155. See id.; see also GROVOGUI, supra note 59; JACKSON, supra note 121; U.O.
UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA (1979); Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im, The National Question, Secession and Constitutionalism: The Mediation
of Competing Claims to Self-Determination, in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN
AFRICAN DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY 101 (Issa Shivji ed., 1991); Jeffrey Herbst, Challenges to
Africa's Boundaries in the New World Order, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 17 (1992); Robert H. Jackson,
Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT'L A.FF. 1 (1992); J. Klabbers & R.
Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Self Determination and Uti-Possidetis, in PEOPLES AND
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (C. Brolmann et al. eds., 1993); u.o. Umozurike,
International Law and Colonialism in Africa, 3 EASTERN AFRICA L. REV. 47 (1970).

156. Kedourie argues that nationalism is a new-fangled and unfamiliar idea for the peo
ple of Asia and Africa. In his view, nationalism was for Europe and it could not be bor
rowed. In essence, he argued that it was inefficient for leaders in these countries to appeal
to nationalism, and he reco=ended that they should instead appeal to traditional idioms
and customary associations that would evoke spontaneous "emotions of solidarity and group
loyalty" in a pavlovian mode. KEDOURIE, supra note 140, at 66. In Kedourie's view, the
new theory of nationalism in the third world constitutes "resentment and impatience of the
rich, and virtue of the poor, the guilt of Europe and the innocence of Asia and Africa, salva
tion through violence . . . the long reign, universal love-served by masses-opium very potent
excites belief into a frenzy of destruction." Id. Hans Kohn, in A HISTORY OF NATIONALISM
IN THE EAST (1929), similarly dichotomizes Western- and Eastern-European nationalism.
He considers the former indigenous and liberal while he opines the latter as non-Western,
artificial, aggressive, and authoritarian. Id. at 3-4. Another perspective holds that third
world nationalism does not even exist, since "agrarian civilisations do not engender nation
alism, but industrial and industrial [sic] societies do." ERNEST GELLNER, CULTURE,
IDENTITY, AND POLIDCS 18

(1987).

157. See, e.g., Homi Bhabha, Introduction to NATION AND NARRATION (Homi Bhabha
ed., 1990). Bhabha notes that there is no single model of nationalism that could prove ade
quate to its myriad and contradictory forms. Nationalisms do not work the same every
where. Hence, observes Bhabha, although the nation functions globally as an irreducible
component of identity, the problem remains that no single term is capable of registering the
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The nation is clearly central to understanding statehood today.
One of the most distinguished historians of Africa, Basil Davidson,
has written extensively on the various ways that arbitrary governance
of artificial states in Africa brought about oppression, civil war, tor
ture, and mass starvation.158 These consequences are in part explicable
by considering "the Janus-face of nationalism, at once an engine of so
cial reform and goad to political accountability, yet also a tool of
middle-class warfare against labour . . . [where] the imaginative
invention of nations tends to outrun the political creation of states."159
Although nationalism in Africa was in large part driven by strug
gles for social justice and political independence, national unity pre
ceded respect for competing claims of nationality within the post
colonial state. The nationalist leadership argued that national unity
was too important to be sacrificed in the name of ethnic loyalty and
that time was too short for development to be distracted by the possi
ble divisiveness of ethnic rivalry that had characterized colonial gov
emance.160 Consequently, attempts to gain self-determination, such as
Biafra in Nigeria and Katanga in the former Zaire, were roundly sup
pressed.161

multiple, incommensurable differences dividing one nation from one another (or from it
self). There is no normal way to define a nation.
158. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF
THE NATION STATE (1992).
159. John Lonsdale, States and Nations, 34 J. AFR HIST. 143, 144 (1993) (book review);
s ee also M.P.K. SORRENSON, LAND REFORM IN KIKUYU COUNTRY (1967); see also DAVID
'THROUP, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MAU MAU 1945-53 (1987); John Lonsdale,
States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey, 24 AFR. STUD. REV. 139
(1981).
.

160. See Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil
Politics in the New States, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR
MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA 105 (Clifford Geertz ed., 1963). Geertz notes that
India's experience raises the question whether a new nation can survive "concession[s] to
'narrow loyalties, petty jealousies and ignorant prejudices?' " Id. at 106 (citations omitted).
Geertz observes that new states have a pre-political matrix of a rudimentary form as evi
denced in its constitution by institutions, beliefs and solidarities. These and other perspec
tives are critically appraised in MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITizEN AND SUBJECT: CON
TEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (Sherry B. Ortner et al.
eds., 1996).
161. Katanga (then Shaba), a province of the former Zaire, today the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, sought to secede from Congo in 1978 to 1979 with assistance from
exiles and rebels from the area. International assistance quelled the rebellion as President
Mubutu's military was unable to respond. The Katanga secessionist attempt indicated the
artificiality of the Zairean state and the complicity of the West in supporting a dictator that
did not even have the command of his military. See Ghislain C. Kabwit, Zaire: The Roots of
the Continuing Crisis, 17 J. MOD. AFR STUD. 381-407 (1979); see also Kenneth Adelman,
Zaire's Year of Crisis, 77 AFR AFF. 306 (1978). The Biafra secession attempt came after
four of Nigeria's regional governments at the time failed to resolve their artificial co
existence 'vithin one country, on the one hand, and the military leadership of the North over
the rest of the country, on the other. This situation had led to successive electoral boycotts,
ethnic cleansing of the Ibo community, and failure to agree on a return to civilian rule in
Nigeria. In May of 1967, the Eastern Region declared itself a sovereign and independent
.
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Under this reading of nationalism, Kenya's freedom struggle, the
Mau Mau War of Independence, can be seen as a nationalist move
ment for social justice and political freedom whose origins are trace
able to British expropriation of land and repression of dissent.162 This
view displaces earlier readings of the Mau Mau that considered it an
atavistic deviation and imitation of the standard European experience.
In reading the Mau Mau as a revolt or rebellion, Eurocentric readings
also advanced the preposterous proposition that it was a savage re
sponse to the alienation of benign colonial modernization.163
Indeed, any reading of statehood that excludes the nation and na
tionalism falls into the danger of characterizing non-European nation
alism as a dangerous hypnotic obsession that differs from the intellect
and reason that characterizes European nationalism.
Nathaniel
Berman's study of European nationalism in the interwar period chal
lenges such a discontinuity. As in Africa, race, culture, place of origin,
and linguistic groups all play a role in European nationalism. Non
European nationalism cannot be regarded as a pathological deviation
from a standard secularized European nationalism.
Rather, as
Berman shows, cultural heterogeneity and nationalist passion were
significant backdrops against which international legal jurists in
Europe proliferated doctrinal and institutional mechanisms such as
plebiscites and minority protection systems within multinational
European societies.164 Consequently, in showing how international
law responded to the challenges of nationality and culture, Berman is
able to illustrate how international law plays a culturally constitutive
role.
In contrast to other international legal scholars, like Makau in the
African context and Berman in the European context, Roth under
states the culturally constitutive character of international law. In his

republic. The federal government declared a state emergency and divided Nigeria into
twelve states. The federal government eventually defeated the secessionist attempt in 1970.
162 See CARL G. ROSBERG & JOHN NOITINGHAM, THE MYTH OF THE MAU MAU:
NATIONALISM IN KENYA {1966).
163. See F.D. CORFIELD, HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND THE GROWTH OF THE MAU MAU
1030 {1960).
164. See Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruc
tion, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 363 {1992). Berman has also examined the relationship be
tween intra-European and colonial aspects of international legal history in the context of
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and Morocco. See, e.g., Nathaniel Berman, The International Law
of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC
CONFLICT 25 (David Wippman ed., 1994); Nathaniel Berman, Aftershocks: Exoticization,
Normalization, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 281; Nathaniel
Berman, Between "Alliance" and "Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationism,
26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 449 {1994); Nathaniel Berman, Beyond Colonialism and
Nationalism? Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia and Peaceful Change, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L LAW 421
(1996); Nathaniel Berman, Economic Consequences, Nationalist Passions: Keynes, Crisis,
Culture and Policy, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 619 (1995); Nathaniel Berman,
Nationalism "Good" and "Bad": Vicissitudes ofan Obsession, 90 A.S.I.L. PROC. 214 (1996).
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emphasis on the state as a juridical entity bereft of any cultural, ethnic,
or other such affiliation, he ignores the origins of the idea of the state
in Western history, its imposition in non-Western societies, and the
violence that has accompanied its creation in the name of nationalism.
That you could find nations anywhere across the world imposing a
Eurocentric notion of the state upon these nations (as colonialism did)
without regard to their nationalities would unsurprisingly result in na
tion building enterprises that were at times successful but, more often
than, not less than successful. In brief, the state as a legal entity is not
a neutral or even universal ideal. For example, in enshrining the
European form of the state as the basic unit of international relations,
international law deploys a specifically European idea as a universal
norm. International law is, in this broad sense, therefore constitutive
to the extent that it privileges the European state as a natural and ba
sic unit of international governance, and it is widely accepted as the
inevitable unit around which nations organize their affairs.
One latent danger in considering the state as a juridical concept is
that international legal analysis then treats states that do not conform
to an idealized European experience as trapped within the straitjacket
of primordial attachments such as ethnicity. However, once the con
cept of the nation is introduced into the analysis, it becomes clear how
juridical statehood plays a constitutive role in manipulating ethnicity,
now seen less as an essential subject but rather as a contingent and
constructed artifact.165
Apart from the African experience alluded to above, there is an
other contemporary example of the danger of looking at the state as
merely juridical: the former Yugoslavia. Elizabeth Woodward has
persuasively argued that post-Cold War security measures based on
the promotion of human rights, transparency, and other nonmilitary
means of conflict resolution, such as the right of peoples to self
determination, inviolability of international borders, and republican
multiparty elections, became hallmarks of European policy in the
former Yugoslavia.166 Consequently, "little regard was paid to the in
consistency of the right of self-determination, on the one hand and the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia's borders. Western powers sup
ported anti-communist supporters in the republican elections not-

165. Nationalist leadership often invoked notions such as India as undivided subjects
with a singular will. Critical appraisals include PARTIIA CHATIERJEE, NATIONALIST
TuOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE? (1986). With regard
to ethnicity, Leroy Vail notes that "[t]he creation of ethnicity as an ideological statement of
popular appeal in the context of profound social, economic and political change in southern
Africa was the result of the differential conjunction of various historical forces and phenom
ena." Leroy Vail, Introduction, in THE CREATION OF TRIBALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 11
(Leroy Vail ed., 1989).
166. See WOODWARD, supra note 100.
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withstanding their extremist nationalist sympathies."167 Woodward's
analysis complements and challenges our understanding of the
Yugoslavian wars of 1991-1994. She demonstrates how secessionist,
anti-Communist, and xenophobic nationalist leaders exploited
Western support as they purported to defend the cherished principles
of self-determination, human rights, and individual liberty. In so
doing, these politicians legitimized their war plans as necessary de
fenses of these principles.168 In conclusion, then, one has to appreciate
that these abstract but cherished principles are not necessarily eman
cipatory;169 viewing them as antidotes to the violence of ethnicity and
illiberal nationalism only downplays the tragic role they have at times
been mobilized to serve. In addition, as Woodward argues, it would
be foolhardy to ignore the role that the policies of IFis played in fan
ning constitutional battles between the republics that eventually ended
up in armed confrontation.170 In acknowledging the constitutive role
that abstract legal concepts such as statehood, self-determination, and
human rights could play against a rapidly changing economic and
social background, it becomes easier to drop the presumption that in
ternational law and norms act in the "interests of human rights, demo
cracy and the people, while local institutions, actors or cultures are
seen as posing a threat to these values."171
VIII. OF DEMOCRACY, NEOLIBERALISM, AND RECOGNITION
Roth also analyzes the case of Nicaragua in his statehood discus
sion. He concludes that exploration with the view that the authoriza
tion for foreign arms and logistical assistance to insurgents fighting the
Samoza regime "indicates some broad-based movement toward recon
sideration of the legal legitimacy that traditional doctrine has auto-

167. Id. at 148.
168. See id. at 198.
169. See Orford, supra note 99, at 444.
170. In one of her bold assertions on this point, Woodward notes that:
Economic reforms such as those demanded of Yugoslavia by foreign creditors and Western
governments ask for political suicide: they require governments to reduce their own powers.
They also do so at the same time that the demands on governments, particularly the neces
sity to protect civil order and to provide stability in the midst of rapid change, are ever
greater. Without a stable civil and legal order, the social conditions that are created can be
explosive: large scale unemployment among young people and unskilled urban dwellers;
demobilized soldiers and security police looking for private employment; thriving conditions
for black market activities and crime; and flourishing local and global traffic in small arms
and ammunition.

WOODWARD, supra note 100, at 17.
171. Orford, supra note 99; see also Michael N. Barnett, Bringing in the New World Or
der: Liberalism, Legitimacy and the United Nations, 49 WORLD POL. 526, 545 (1997) (noting
that "much of the Third World is viewed
not as a source of support for a liberal interna
tional order but rather as a potential site of resistance").
. • •
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matically conferred on governments in effective control" (p. 303). His
point is that, just as cases of racist, colonial, or alien control are ille
gitimate ab initio, so is a "ruling apparatus that is manifestly unrepre
sentative of the underlying sovereign political community or that fla
grantly violates certain irreducible duties upon which all legitimate
governance is predicated" (p. 303). Roth is not, however, oblivious to
the mixed motivations such interventions involve, as his references to
the U.S.'s "neo-colonialist penetration" of Cambodia and Vietnam (p.
289) and candid but uncritical assessment of the U.S.'s role in
Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador indicate.172 He is therefore care
ful to warn of unilateral use of force based on ass�ssments of foreign
regimes, since such unilateral action constitutes a violation of the types
of actions that the international order seeks to preclude. Roth's dis
cussion of the Panamanian case therefore warns of the danger of uni
lateral action and cites approval for a multilateral approach that would
have greater acceptability. He also sees prospects of a consensus in fa
vor of empirical manifestations of popular will with "the increased
role of the international organizations and NGOs [Nongovernmental
Organizations] in orchestrating and monitoring electoral solutions to
civil conflict" (p. 320). This improved context for the empirical mani
festations of popular will is the backdrop against which Roth discusses
Haiti.
His discussion of the debates surrounding six cases of credentials
to the U.N. - Congo-Leopoldville, Yemen, Cambodia/Khmer
Republic, Cambodia/Kampuchea, China, and Hungary - "do not
yield straightforward answers to dilemmas in recognition doctrine" (p.
283). In his view, the cases show no consistent presumption in favor of
the established government or the willingness of a government to
abide by international commitments as a baseline for recognition. The
effective-control doctrine cannot, therefore, be mechanically applied
since the recognition of governments turns out to be informed by a
range of considerations - legal, political, practical, and moral. Would
the increased empirical manifestations of popular will displace the un
predictability of recognition or add to its toolkit of criteria to be taken
into account?
The answer here is clearly ambiguous. How, for example, should
the will of the people, underlying authority of government guaranteed
in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),173 be construed? Does it merely refer to a process of ascer
taining voter preference as long as it guarantees competition and par
ticipation, a la liberals, or should it be inferred from the ability of a
172. Pp. 347-57. For a critical assessment, see Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A
Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L LJ. 341 (1995).
173. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
(1948).

G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
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government to fulfill "an assigned social function," (such as achieve
ment of effective control in the name of a program of social transfor
mation), a la revolutionary-democratic dictatorships? Does the ab
sence of reference to the will of the people as the basis of the authority
ofgovernment in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)174 leave open the nature of the relationship
between authority and elections and authority and participation (p.
330)? Does the reference to democratic society in Article 21 of the
UDHR mean more than just nonfascist? Why did Article 21 of the
ICCPR not specify multi-party elections as a basis of establishing
authority? Why was the term "democratic society" omitted in Article
25 of the ICCPR (p. 332)?
Roth provides the answer on the basis of the post-Cold War praxis
and perhaps an emerging opinio juris:
With the end of the Cold War period has come a shift in the patterns
of international division regarding participatory rights. The most robust
challenge to the liberal-democratic approach, the concept of
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship that held sway in the Socialist and
in much of the Non-Aligned bloc, has been crippled by the ignominious
collapse of the Soviet and Eastern European regimes and the fading
away of revolutionary nationalist regimes and movements in the Third
World. Of the remaining regimes of revolutionary origin, some, like
China and Vietnam, have reversed their programmatic course so thor
oughly as to render invocations of revolutionary struggle implausi
ble . . . .
. . . There are thus many fewer general appeals in the international
discourse to the liberal-authoritarian rationale that popular movements
need be suppressed in order to maintain liberty, although the claim con
tinues to be made in individual cases . . . . [pp. 333-34]
Roth therefore concludes that, to the extent that there is no longer a
universalist alternative to liberal democracy and that exceptions to it
are made on the basis of cultural particularity, this perhaps explains
why de facto control is insufficient to substantiate the claims of auto
cratic leaders. Yet, as Roth concludes, the right to political participa
tion is open to many interpretations. In addition, he says that elec
tions in many parts of the world have been less than liberal or
democratic, since they have coexisted with "de jure or de facto repres
sion, exclusion of candidates regarded as unacceptable, and reserves of
power for unelected (especially military) elites, not to mention
mechanisms for the perpetration of fraud" (p. 337). Hence, while
popular sovereignty may be used to deprive a regime of de facto rec
ognition, it does not follow that popular sovereignty necessarily stems
from a liberal democratic interpretation or that forcible or nonforcible
174. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY
No. 2 (1977), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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interventions should result in cases of noncompliance with this
"democratic entitlement" (p. 339). This democratic entitlement is
only one of several methods by which popular will may be assessed. It
may well be assessed through time-honored traditions, demonstra
tions, public opinion, and so on. Indeed, according to Roth:
A dictatorial government, even though failing to provide adequate
mechanisms to render it accountable, may nonetheless appear legitimate
in the eyes of the majority of its subjects. Moreover, an elected govern
ment may not . . . . [Consequently,] it cannot be said a priori that coups
d'etat, emergency rule, or even substantial periods of one-party or coali
tional dictatorship violate popular sovereignty.
This is not to say that the principle of popular sovereignty cannot give
rise to a legal judgment of governmental illegitimacy. It is merely to say
that such a judgment cannot be predicated solely on the failure of a gov
ernmental system to conform to a specified institutional form. [p. 344]
Roth also acknowledges that there are instances where methods quali
tatively superior to effective control are possible and necessary to
measure legitimacy - such as where elections are used as part of the
arbitration between antagonistic parties, where these parties consent
to the elections. Here the elections are a superior predictor of popular
will (p. 364). Roth therefore has a rich telling of a complex story.
Having already concluded that the effective control doctrine cannot be
mechanically applied to determine legitimacy of governments, his dis
cussion of political-participation rights comes to a similar conclusion
- empirical manifestations of popular will through processes such as
elections are unpredictable indicators of popular will, just like effective
control.
International response to the Haitian coup of September, 1991 is,
however, for Roth the momentous case indicating a clear demonstra
tion that liberal internationalism may upstage effective control as a
predictor of legitimacy or popular will. The swift international denial
of legal recognition for the coup regime followed closely on the heels
of the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the
Inter-American system (pp. 374-77). Did this only indicate the in
creased importance of participatory mechanisms in determining
popular sovereignty in the Western hemisphere, or was it an ac
cidental constellation of an unusual set of circumstances unlikely to be
replicated? In Roth's view, "[g]iven the strength of traditions dis
favoring direct international judgements on the legitimacy of internal
processes of rule, and given the persistence of broadly-supported pro
nouncements evoking those traditions, prudence dictates reading the
Santiago, Moscow, and similar documents narrowly" (p. 376; footnote
omitted).
Roth subsequently discusses how the Security Council justified use
of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to restore Aristide, for
purposes of assessing "states' collective perception of the legal limits
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to action, not with the political determinants of actions taken within
those perceived limits" (p. 383 n.57 ; emphasis added). The fact that
Roth gives this disclaimer in a footnote is as revealing as it is striking.
It is striking since he celebrates Haiti as the point at which the interna
tional law of governmental legitimacy is born (p. 387), and it is re
vealing for what it fails to examine. As Richard Falk has argued, the
U.S.-led U.N. intervention to reinstall Aristide in Haiti continues a
dilemma of international diplomatic interventionism - it simultane
ously promises democracy promotion and protects the economic rights
of investors and the traditional elite in these countries in ways inimical
to socia� and economic progress.175 Hence, Aristide's return to power
was conditional upon his abandonment of his populist program of re
distributing disproportionate concentrations of property and ill-gotten
wealth from the propertied classes to the poor majority. He had to
commit himself to the stringent programs of economic restructuring of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that favored returns to in
vestment in terms of growth and profitability at the expense of social
spending.176 The amnesty given to the allies of the dictatorship of
General Cedras also raises troubling issues for a political agenda that
simply buried problems in the quicksand of economic dislocation and
political repression. As Falk remarks:
What kind of restoration of democracy is taking place if the program and
orientation of the elected leader is being scrapped as a condition for the
support of his return? And is not the new approach to development en
dorsed by Aristide tantamount to an acceptance of the right-wing pro
gram favored by the military? What is worse, if Haiti goes along this
path, there is no short-term assurance that the acute poverty plaguing
ninety-five percent of Haitians will be relieved, or that the overall condi
tion of the society will be improved.177
Hence, just when Roth celebrates Haiti as the exemplary contempo
rary case of successful prodemocracy intervention, we realize just how
hollow this success story is for poverty-stricken Haitians. Their trag
edy was compounded by the U.S. authorities who violated interna
tional norms of non-refoulement by refusing to give Haitians fleeing
the atrocities of the military regime refugee status in the U.S.178 Tem
porary relief against return to Haiti was won in U.S. courts, but the
175. See Falk, supra note 172, at 348.
176. See id. at 347. For another critical and important assessment, see ROBINSON, supra
note 55, at 305-16, 333-39.
177. Falk, supra note 172, at 353. According to Robinson, the political intervention in
Haiti "included multiple overlaps between the penetration of transnational capital, the
class structures and the emergence of new political protagonists, external constraints which
the global economy placed on internal policy options and socioeconomic transforma
tions . . . . " ROBINSON, supra note 55, at 335.
• • ,

178. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in the United States Human Rights
Policy, 103 YALE LJ. 2391 (1994).
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U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the refugees.179 As the current un
dersecretary for Human Rights argued, the courts implicitly endorsed
the anti-immigrant sentiment in the country whose image of the "ar
chetypal 'good' alien . . . is a white, European, healthy, heterosexual,
self-sufficient refugee, arriving alone in search of political asylum. . . .
[I]t hardly surprises that black, poor Caribbean migrants arriving in
large numbers, many afflicted with HIV . . . should fare badly in our
courts."180 The increasingly hostile post-Cold War attitude towards
refugees, especially those from non-Western countries, has been ac
companied by a discourse of in-country protection and internally dis
placed persons at the expense of the post-Second World War refugee
framework that protected refugees against involuntary return to their
persecutors.
Last but not least, the Supreme Court rejected the Haitian refu
gees' attempt to enforce their rights against non-refoulement at federal
and international law, mainly on the basis that the U.S. could not en
force this right extraterritorially (the refugees were not considered to
be in the United States, as most were quarantined in the infamous
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba).181 Paradoxically, the Supreme
Court within the same period "permitted extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct that produces a substantial an
ticompetitive effect in the United States."182 The different outcomes in
these cases indicate an underlying public/private split - the U.S.
could unproblematically extend the territorial reach of its commercial
legislation overseas, but it would be slow to extend domestic human
rights protection to migrants from a poor third-world country. I have
already argued that a public/private scheme, such as the one that un
derlies the Supreme Court's decisions here, is fallacious. It presup
poses that private law rules are neutral, while cases of collective non
recognition of governments and interventions in civil society, such as
applying U.S. law to a foreign country, are necessarily political and
should be minimized. However, as my commentary on the Haitian in
tervention illustrates, the international economic programs imposed
by the U.S.-dominated IMF should not be confused with the rhetoric
of "a clash between a liberating foreign force and a corrupt local rul
ing class" since it really was "the sealing of a long-term pact between
that foreign force and the Haitian elite."183 To construe these eco
nomic programs in the discourse of neutrality is to clothe alliances of
domination and exploitation with a veil of legitimacy.

179. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) .
180. Koh, supra note 178, at 2422.
181. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 188-207 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) .
182 Id. at 2418 (emphasis removed) .
183. ROBINSON, supra note 55, at 307.
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CONCLUSION: DECENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
ILLEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENTS
This Review has argued in favor of decentering the international
law of governmental legitimacy away from: its Eurocentric binary be
tween liberalism and conservatism; its formalism in separating law
from politics and therefore in construing the state as a juridical entity
separate from the nation; its binary opposition between public and
private interventions; and its decontextualization from the centrality
of the history of colonialism in international law and from the regres
sive programs of economic reform known as neoliberalism. Having
made these critiques in a variety of contexts, I conclude that Roth
overstates the law of illegitimacy or legitimacy of governments in in
ternational law exclusively as a set of rules or policy options without
considering it as one component in a toolkit of political strategies and
ideas that get deployed every day. His study would have been much
richer and more legitimate had it engaged in a critical enterprise that
did not shy away from colonialism and neoliberalism. It would have
broadened our understanding of the legitimacy not only of govern
ments, but also of the private order over which international law lies,
of international institutions and their programs, and of the nature of
the interaction these institutions have with third-world countries and
their elites.
One of the striking omissions from the book is the manner in
which governments that fail to conform to the nonnegotiable pro
grams of neoliberal economic restructuring lose their entitlements to
IMF and World Bank programs and lending, even if they would oth
erwise be entitled to them. There is, in fact, perhaps no better exam
ple of how states lose their legal entitlements, and thus their legiti
macy, at the international level than through the relationships they
have with international capital. That Roth fails to connect the eco
nomic programs now being pursued around the world with the hu
manitarian impulse behind humanitarian interventionism is therefore
significant. His rationalization, to the effect that his project is not po
litical but legal, dismally fails to explain this omission.
I contend that, if debates on legitimacy in international law were
decentered from their statistism and Eurocentricity, and contextual
ized in the rich and complex interactions of colonialism, neoliberalism
and non-European ways of thinking about legitimacy, a richer dis
course of legitimacy would be possible. Such a strategy would involve
a new politics that would not be tied to the legalism underlying Roth's
project or his thesis of a clash between universalism and cultural par
ticularity as the alignment of post-Cold War world conflict. This new
politics would instead displace and decenter the search for legitimacy
in monolithic, homogenous, and universal categories in favor of in
creasing our attention to the legitimacy of international institutions
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and laws and alliances between local and global politics and economic
programs as may be evidenced in colonialism or neoliberalism. In ad
dition, non-Western sources of legitimacy inspired by the ethical and
political virtue of these societies in their heterogeneity would greatly
enrich the discourse on legitimacy. Indeed, as Roth's analysis sug
gests, even legitimacy in the West cannot be located in any single pa
rameter. There is therefore no better way to democratize national and
international society than to multiply the sites at which we look for le
gitimacy (private, public, national, international, etc.) and sources of
its underlying meaning in the rich diversity of international society. A
discourse on legitimacy irrelevant to the non-European world will be
as hollow as the promises of an international law unable to examine its
alliance with projects such as colonialism and programs such as neo
liberalism.
Hence, insofar as neoliberalism delegitimizes social provisioning
for public health and education programs by stigmatizing public policy
as inefficient and susceptible to corrupt and authoritarian governance,
there is need for an optic in the international legal discourse on legiti
macy through which such an outcome can be expressed. For example,
one could argue that such delegitimation is suspect since its justifica
tions have often proved false, if not tragic, in many a developing coun
try. Hence, reducing governmental interventions in the economy has
not automatically led to increase in economic growth and personal
freedom in many of these countries. The argument that governmental
interventions in the economy, including those intended to redress so
cial division, hierarchy, and inequality in society, are inefficient or
profit-constraining becomes an apology for the redistribution of na
tional income in favor of profit or capital by the removal of such
profit-constraining regulations, including those that support welfare
needs. The neoliberal argument that the pain of economic restruc
turing is a necessary cost that a society must bear in order to produce a
higher rate of investment, productivity, growth, and profit must hence
factor into any discourse of legitimacy with democracy as its goal.
Neoliberalism is an invitation of nineteenth-century classical legal
thought with its attendant disposition against moral and political rea
soning. It is committed to the necessity of a decentralized market
economy and political system that could increase wealth while main
taining freedom and avoiding the tyranny of postcolonial authoritari
anism. In view of this brooding neoliberal omnipresence, the impera
tive to democratize the discourse on legitimacy remains critical and
urgent.

